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1. Background 
 
Climate change represents an immediate and unprecedented threat to the food security of 
hundreds of millions of people who depend on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods. 
At the same time, agriculture and related activities also contribute to climate change, by 
intensifying greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and altering the land surface. Responses 
aimed at adapting to climate change may have negative consequences for food security, just 
as measures taken to increase food security may exacerbate climate change. This complex 
and dynamic relationship between climate change, agriculture and food security is also 
influenced by wider factors. Agricultural and food systems are heavily influenced by socio-
economic conditions, which are affected by multiple processes, such as macro-level 
economic policies, political conflict, the spread of infectious diseases, etc. 
 
Concerted action is urgently needed to address the complex and uncertain political and 
economic challenges of food security. A new research initiative is needed to inform this 
action – one that integrates and applies the best and most promising approaches, tools and 
technologies emerging from numerous disciplines. The involvement of farmers, policy-
makers, researchers, donors and other stakeholder groups in the research process is key. 
Successful mitigation and adaptation will entail not only individual behavioural changes, but 
also changes in technology, institutions, agricultural systems and socio-economic systems. 
These changes cannot be achieved without improving interactions between scientists and 
decision-makers at all levels of society. 
 
Methods are needed to help policymakers and resource managers evaluate the trade-offs 
between local benefits and global goods when addressing food, energy and water scarcity 
(among others) and planning land use options for resilience, given the uncertainties of the 
future. The goals and interests of stakeholders cannot be ignored, and reconciling these 
with global goods is essential. 
 
Greater adaptive capacity has to be fostered, allowing communities to draw upon a range of 
options to support their livelihoods. This, in turn, implies a greater adaptive capacity on the 
part of policymakers, decision makers and scientists. An enabling institutional and policy 
environment is needed, and sustained efforts to improve the links among and between 
research, the policy environment and stakeholders in developing countries are required.  
 
Scenario analysis conducted at the regional level is an innovative approach to systematically 
explore the technical, institutional and policy options that these different sets of 
stakeholders have at their disposal in tackling this complex set of concerns. 
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Objectives of the CCAFS programme  
1. Close critical gaps in the knowledge of how to enhance – and manage the trade-offs 
between – food security, livelihood and environmental goals in the face of a 
changing climate (see Figure 1 below). 
2. Develop and evaluate options for adapting to a changing climate to inform 
agricultural development, food security policy and donor investment strategies. 
3. Enable and assist farmers, policymakers, researchers and donors to continually 
monitor, assess and adjust their actions in response to observed and anticipated 
changes in climate. 
 
Figure 1. Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
 
2. Engaging stakeholders 
 
Understanding vulnerability, identifying appropriate interventions, assessing their effective-
ness, and leaving a sustained legacy of improved decision making, all depend critically on 
effective modes of engagement with a range of stakeholders at different levels. CCAFS is 
initially being implemented in three regions, viz. West Africa, East Africa and the Indo-
Gangetic Plains.1 Research within the focus regions will target scales ranging from the field 
and household to sub-regions. Local level questions – researched in case-studies at the sub-
regional level - will be integrated into regional-level perspectives.  
 
Within the ‘Integration for Decision Making’ theme, CCAFS activities are oriented towards 
firstly, ensuring that climate variability and climate change issues are mainstreamed into 
national, regional and international agricultural development strategies and institutional 
agendas; and secondly, that innovative information products and communication processes 
                                                          
1 Through scoping studies and regional consultations the following countries have been selected in 
each region for initial inclusion in the scenario development work in East Africa – Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. 
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are developed and maintained at local, national and regional levels. One of these processes 
to drive the articulation and integration of stakeholder voices and priorities at the regional 
level, is the development of regional scenarios. 
3. Approach taken to Scenario development in East Africa 
 
The approach adopted here is to develop scenarios for East Africa to 2030 using a 
qualitative, narrative approach that takes account of the three components of the CCAFS 
programme. Over the course of approximately 12 months, the outputs will be developed 
and refined through interaction with a wider group of stakeholders and through interaction 
with the quantitative modelling community, specifically in the agricultural modelling sphere. 
The practical steps for implementing this approach are outlined below. 
 
3.1. Steps for developing regional Scenarios  
Step 1:  Identify key regional CC-Agric-FS practical and policy issues through stakeholder 
consultation workshops involving CCAFS Thematic researchers and regional 
stakeholders including scientists, policy-makers, the private sector and civil society; 
Step 2:   Once the key issues have been identified, engage in a strategic conversation with 
stake-holders in each region to define the range of questions to address in the 
scenarios exercises; 
Step 3:  Assemble regional scenarios teams to draft a set of prototype regional scenarios; 
Step 4: Describe and systematically assess developments per scenario for each key food 
security determinant; 
Step 5: Plot and compare each assessment of food security outcomes. The analysis is likely 
to use at least one common axis for all regional analyses; 
Step 6:  Facilitate interactions and learning between the three regional scenarios teams; 
Step 7: Institute procedures to evaluate and learn from the scenario analysis process. 
 
3.2. Important considerations for the CCAFS Scenarios development activity include: 
 
(i) Identify the key stakeholders to ensure appropriate participation; 
(ii) Maximise stakeholder engagement to engender buy-in; 
(iii) Decide on the main areas of uncertainty to identify the focal questions; 
(iv) Agree on the main drivers of change to 2030 to determine the nature of the 
narratives; 
(v) Agree on the optimum combination of qualitative/quantitative analysis to decide the 
degree of quantification; 
(vi) Explore the implications of the scenarios to point to appropriate adaptation options;  
(vii) Plot strategies that will optimise communication and learning to ensure impact. 
 
4. Developing prototype scenarios in the East Africa region 
 
4.1. Scenario Development Workshop 1: Nairobi 
Working in close collaboration with CCAFS’ regional partner, ASARECA, key stakeholders 
were identified and invited to the first workshop (Scen WS1). This workshop was held in 
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Nairobi, Kenya during 25-26 August 2010. Annex 1 lists the workshop participants. The Scen 
WS1 objectives were: 
 
(i) To familiarise the participants with the concepts, purpose and methodology to be 
followed in developing qualitative scenarios for East Africa 
(ii) To discuss and agree on the main drivers and their uncertainties for the region in 
respect of Climate change, agriculture and food security 
(iii) Based on these drivers, to derive a set of four or more ‘future worlds’ that will 
provide the framework for developing the prototype scenario narratives 
(iv) To identify writing teams to undertake the work of expanding these narratives and 
to ensure that ownership of the scenarios begins to emerge from within the region 
 
It was envisaged that by the end of the first day of the workshop, all participants would have 
a basic familiarity with scenario development, and be in a position to work in groups to map 
out three to four scenarios for East Africa in 2030. It was made clear, however, that this 
workshop was the start of a process, and not a one-off event which would deliver a polished 
product. There would be a follow up meeting as well as a period of work in between. By the 
end of this workshop, however, the facilitators hoped to establish a strong outline for 
plausible futures for food security and agriculture in East Africa, as well as identify 
individuals who would take the process forward, to develop the narratives and thereby to 
begin to take full ownership of the process. 
 
During Day One of the workshop, participants identified and prioritised the drivers that are 
important in this region for agriculture and food security to 2030. They were charged with 
addressing the following question: What are the major driving issues and their uncertainties 
for EA food security and agriculture/land use? Identify a set of 3 to 5 key drivers that are 
also uncertain. The key drivers with the greatest uncertainty to 2030 as identified and 
agreed upon are listed in Table 1:  
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Table 1: Key drivers in East Africa and their uncertainty  
 
 Key Drivers Uncertainty 
1.  Globalisation   How globalisation will play out in East Africa 
(including the rate of uptake of new technologies) 
2.  Regional integration in East Africa The impact on political stability and the capacity to 
implement change in the region 
3.  Environmental management 
(including of land and water 
resources) 
Whether the region will take a proactive or reactive 
approach to environmental management 
4.  Markets – the influx of foreign 
investment, trade and influence from 
the East (and West) 
The impact of markets and especially of the 
investments by emergent world powers 
 
Two additional drivers were identified as critically important, but their degree of uncertainty 
was more limited and they were assumed to be constant across all narratives to 2030. These 
are: 
- Climate change (1 deg + to 2030), [but with increased climate variability] 
- Population increase up to 360 million in East Africa [but with increased population mobility 
and therefore varying population densities in rural and urban areas] 
 
The impact of these two drivers emerges in each of the narratives.  
 
Break-out groups were then charged with imagining two or more plausible future worlds 
that were shaped by these key drivers and with outlining their essential features. During the 
subsequent plenary report-back and discussion, consensus emerged around the 
commonalities in the various plausible future worlds. Participants agreed on two critical 
‘organising’ uncertainties: 
 
(i) the extent of regional integration (both political and economic) anticipated by 2030 
(ii) the proactive/reactive stance of governments (and other regional actors) at the 
regional level in relation to environmental management and food security.  
 
This analysis provided the structure for a ‘two-axis’ schema that could underpin the 
plausibility of the prototype scenarios (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2: The ‘two-axis’ schema for drivers in East Africa to 2030 
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Through an iterative process of further group work and plenary sessions, four ‘zero-order’ 
narratives were developed, and their key assumptions and logically consistent features were 
briefly explored. These were:  
 
1 =  Regional integration and proactive stance (towards environmental management and 
food security) 
2 =  Regional integration and reactive stance 
3 =  Status quo and proactive stance 
4 =  Status quo and reactive stance 
 
Note that ‘Status quo’ does not imply or indicate stagnation, but rather than the slow and 
uneven rate of integration that characterises the present situation in East Africa. A process 
for further development of the narratives for each scenario was elaborated. This involved a 
group of participants volunteering to expand the ‘zero-order’ narratives for each scenario. 
Fourteen people, comprising four groups of up to four writers and reviewers each, had a 
period of six weeks to expand these narratives in preparation for the second Scenario 
workshop (Scen WS2) and were provided with detailed guidelines to assist with this task. 
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5. Essential features of the four narratives 
 
 Narrative Essential features 
1.  Regional integration and proactive Regional integration has led to political stability, major 
investments in regional infrastructure and telecommuni-
cations, and sustained economic growth in the region. A 
proactive, strategic focus at the regional level on 
agriculture-led development has paid dividends in 
respect of greater agric commodity and value-added 
exports. Although governments in the region have been 
proactive in improving food security and reducing 
poverty, pastoralists, small-scale farmers and fishers are 
the big losers: a drop in rangeland productivity 
coincident with a more efficient, export-led but 
concentrated (in terms of ownership) livestock 
production sector; more efficient agriculture pushes 
peasant farmers out; and the use of water for agriculture 
means that the needs of fishing communities are not 
adequately considered. Environmental management is 
proactive – an already-agreed afforestation programme 
is implemented and, although under considerable 
pressure from all users, the management of regional 
water resources improves. 
2.  Regional integration and reactive Regional economic and political integration has realised 
substantial gains and trade is booming in the region. 
Regional growth is based on investment in export-led 
industrial development, infrastructural development and 
agro-processing, but the region is reactive to shocks, so 
growth has been at expense of the environment and 
food security. The water situation in the region is 
particularly dire: water shortages are common and key 
water sources are badly polluted. Soil erosion has also 
reached alarming proportions. Populations have shifted 
en masse to urban areas. It is left to NGOs, civil society 
organisations and foreign donor governments to 
pressure the EA Federation to alleviate poverty and 
introduce a climate-sensitive environmental manage-
ment regime. 
3.  Status quo and proactive A lack of progress on regional integration and on internal 
governance is a feature of this scenario in 2030. The 
competitive interests of individual states prevail at the 
expense of the region as a whole. However, investments 
in transport infrastructure – led by Asian superpower 
countries and companies – have been significant. 
Excellent progress has been made in proactively 
managing the region’s water resources, with this work 
largely funded by the Global Climate Change Mitigation 
and Adaptation Fund. However, smaller countries with 
weaker and often more corrupt governments, and the 
urban poor, remain water insecure. Some growth has 
been the norm, progress has been slow in relation to 
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poverty reduction and it is NGOs that are most proactive 
in this respect. Other than in the water sector, many 
countries in the region has been ‘proactive on paper’ in 
respect of environmental management: some have made 
good progress, others have not progressed at all. The 
Asian investments in the economy and the environment 
are very noticeable, with both positive and negative 
impacts. In 2030, most EAC countries still fail to achieve 
food security. 
4.  Status quo and reactive This scenario depicts East Africa in 2030 as a region that 
is characterised by poor governance, corruption, a lack of 
integration, widespread political instability, conflicts over 
natural resources and continued exposure to the 
negative effects of globalisation. Furthermore, there is 
limited planning of initiatives directed towards 
addressing poverty, food insecurity, livelihood 
diversification, markets access and environmental 
degradation. In this ‘do-it-yourself’ situation, economies 
have contracted. Predatory investments by multi-
nationals from Brazil, Russia, India, China or South Africa 
(BRICS), as well as the existing (Western) ones, provides 
further pressure that is dealt with reactively, and as it 
arises by individual countries. Agriculture remains the 
mainstay of the region’s economy, but remains 
underfunded and hunger stalks the land. Environmental 
resources suffer because governments react to 
environmental crises only once ecosystems collapse and 
human suffering becomes critical. Nearly everyone loses, 
but pastoralists are among the biggest losers. 
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6. Scenario Development Workshop 2: Dar es Salaam 
 
Scen WS2 was hosted by the Pan-Africa Office of ESSP-START at the Institute for Resource 
Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. It was held in Dar es Salaam during 
5-7 October 2010. Twenty-four people attended, including most of the core writing team. 
 
6.1. The objectives of the Scen WS2 were to: 
 
 Present and then refine a draft set of four East African scenario narratives based on 
the work done at and since the first workshop 
 Agree on a viable set of Food Security, Environment and Livelihoods (FSEL) 
synergy/trade-off variables of interest to CCAFS (cf. Figure 1, p 4) 
 Identify synergies and trade-offs between FSEL variables to 2030 and analyse 
changes in FSEL variables, given the logic of each scenario.  
 Plan follow-up activities in the region 
 
6.2. Headings to use to discuss the narratives:  
 
 The global situation in this narrative (= introduction)  
 Integration (of governance and markets) 
 Infrastructural development 
 Agricultural development 
 Natural resource management 
 Food security 
 Livelihoods 
The writing teams were asked to consider how the narrative played out if struck by a 
devastating drought across the region that lasts for 3 years (around 2020-2022) and 
seriously affects food security. They were also asked to give more thought to: 
- energy provision and use 
- Conflicts (especially over natural resources) 
- Who provides food for urban populations? 
- Who would be the winners and losers in their narrative? 
 
Once the narratives reached a level of coherence and plausibility (see below), the FSEL 
variables became the focus of group work and plenary sessions. Thirteen FSEL variables 
were identified and agreed upon during plenary discussion:  
 
Box 2:  Thirteen FSEL variables that contribute to food security, environmental and 
livelihood outcomes (Each of these variables has a number of constituent elements –see 
Table 1 below) 
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Changes in the FSEL variables were then analysed for each of the four narratives by 
(i) describing how the commonly-agreed constituent elements for each FSEL variable would 
change, and why  
(ii) systematically assessing the changes using a semi-quantitative method (++ = strongly 
+ve; + = weakly +ve; 0 = no change; - = weakly -ve; -- strongly -ve); and then deriving an 
overall “net” change for the FSEL variable (see below). 
(iii) Net changes for the FSEL variables for each narrative were then plotted on a spider 
diagram  
  
 
1. Variables that contribute to Food security outcomes 
- affordability of staple foods 
- regional production of staple foods 
- effectiveness of distribution mechanisms 
- nutritional value of staple foods 
2. Variables that contribute to Environmental outcomes 
- water quality  
- soil quality 
- forest cover 
- biodiversity status 
- water sufficiency for agriculture 
3. Variables that contribute to Social/livelihood outcomes 
- financial wealth of individuals (includes income and assets) 
- social capital at community level 
- health 
- knowledge and skills necessary to ensure that the whole food system 
operates efficiently and innovatively 
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Table 1: The constituent elements for each FSEL variable in the EA narratives: 
 
 
FSEL Variable Key Factors 
FOOD SECURITY: Affordability of staple foods Employment levels and certainty (= incomes) 
 Agricultural productivity (= food prices) 
 Government intervention and subsidies (= food prices) 
 Extent of urbanisation  
(= affordability through economies of scale) 
Regional production of staple foods Use of latest technologies, varieties, breeds  
(= levels of production) 
 Costs of production (= levels of production compared to 
other agric products) 
 Farmers’ preferences (= food vs. cash crops, bio-fuels) 
 Sustainable farming and thus productivity over time  
(= sustained yields) 
Effectiveness of distribution mechanisms State of infrastructure (= cost of transport) 
 Grain storage and grain reserves  
(= better response times) 
 Trade and tariff regimes  
(= cost of cross-border transfers) 
 Opportunities to process raw foods (= longevity) 
Nutritional value of staple foods 
 
Use of pesticides and other chemicals  
(= level of harmful practices in agriculture) 
 Use of fortified varieties (= nutritional value) 
 Availability of staple foods during crises, eg. droughts  
(= maintenance of calorie intakes) 
  
ENVIRONMENTAL: Water quality Intensification of agriculture (= pollution of water 
sources) 
 Common policies to manage water (= improved quality) 
 Improved Soil and Water Conservation  
(= less erosion, improved water quality) 
Soil quality Intensification of agriculture (= breakdown of soils) 
 Deforestation and use of marginal lands (= erosion) 
 Adoption of technologies to enhance soil fertility  
(= improved soil quality) 
Forest Cover Conversion of forests to agricultural use (= reduction) 
 Common policies to protect forests (= increased cover) 
 High demand for forest timber products  
(= poor management of old forests) 
 Adoption of afforestation programmes  
(= increased cover) 
Biodiversity Change in proportion of mono-cropping  
(= reduced agro-biodiversity) 
 Economic contribution of wildlife and tourism  
(= protection of biodiversity) 
 Availability of funds from Mitigation and Biodiversity 
Conventions/programmes (= greater/less protection) 
Water sufficiency Agreements to manage transboundary water resources 
(= greater likelihood of sufficient water) 
 Increased temperature (= increased evapotranspiration) 
 Competing demands for water (= price increases) 
 Improved water management technologies (= less 
wastage) 
 Wetland and water table management  
14 
 
(= better management) 
LIVELIHOODS:  Financial wealth Improve conditions of employment in agriculture 
 (= improved incomes) 
 Higher commodity prices (= greater investment) 
 Privatisation of social services (= fewer safety nets) 
 Access to financial services  
(= ability to respond to economic opportunities) 
Social capital Changes in incomes (= status in community) 
 Consumerism (= weaker social networks) 
 Political instability  
(= social conflicts, inclu over natural resources) 
 Extent of agric commercialisation  
(= the poorest into urban slums) 
Health Effective structures and institutions of governance  
(= provision of public health) 
 Government investment in health (= equitable health) 
 Regionally integrated, intensive agriculture  
(= increased threat of disease outbreaks & pandemics) 
 Donor funding for special projects, eg. malaria 
(= health indices shift) 
Knowledge & Skills Improved ICT infrastructure (= greater market opps.) 
 Market innovations (= higher demand for diverse skills) 
 Strengthened Early Warning Systems (= reduced risk) 
 Farmer Support agencies (= increased productivity) 
 Science and Technology products (= productivity) 
 Utilisation of traditional knowledge  
(= market uniformity and greater vulnerability) 
 
In describing and systematically assessing the changes in each variable, the four narrative 
writing teams were asked to refer - as far as possible - to these constituent elements for 
each FSEL variable.   
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7. Analysis of FSEL variables  
 
SCENARIO 1 : REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND PRO-ACTIVE: Analysis of FSEL variables 
 
FSEL variables  Description of change Net effect (2030) 
Food security 
outcomes 
  
Affordability of staple 
foods  
Greater employment opportunities resulting from free 
movement of labour, higher agricultural productivity & 
export demand, and increased economic growth of the 
region lead to increased in-farm and off-farm incomes. 
(+) 
Food prices increases due to increase in demand (locally 
and globally), increase in income and consumptions and 
increase in labour and input costs.  (-) 
Strong regional and national governments through 
appropriate interventions (subsidies, price control, 
import/export policies) stabilise prices and make food 
available by the local people. (+) 
Increased income and urbanisation will lead to 
diversification of food choices (crops and livestock 
based). (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
++ 
 
Regional production of 
local foods 
The impacts of one degree increase in temp will start to 
reduce regional food production by 10% by 2028. (-)  
In the 18 years to then, however, regional food 
production has increased by a total of 50% due to 
increased use of improved technologies, such as  
irrigation, fertilisers, improved crop varieties and 
livestock breeds. (+ +) 
The migrations of youth and educated out of agriculture 
will reduce labour availability for agriculture leading to 
increased wages and use of mechanisation resulting to 
increase cost of production. (-) 
Farmer’s preference to grow crops for cash income 
(including bio-fuels) results in reduced production of 
food crops locally. (-) 
Intensive use of limited available lands especially in 
Rwanda, Highland s of Ethiopia, central and western 
provinces of Kenya results in low productivity. (-) 
 
_ _ 
Effectiveness of 
distribution systems  
The improved infrastructure (roads, railways, storage 
structures) access to market information and market 
integration facilitates effective movement of 
agricultural produce in the EAC region in a cost effective 
manner. (++)  
The region has created enough grain reserves to 
moderate the prices and meet the short falls during 
droughts. (+) 
 Flexible trade and tariffs in the region led to produce 
moving to urban areas where prices are high making 
 
+  
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food for local pope expensive. (-) 
 Increased opportunities to process and store perishable 
food produce contributed to increase in the prices of 
most of staple foods. (-) 
Nutritional value of 
staple food 
Intensive cultivation using pesticides and chemicals has 
adversely affected the quality of foods. (-) 
Growing realisation of the value of local foods and use 
of fortified varieties improve the nutritional value of 
staple foods. (+) 
Increased urbanisation has led to increased 
consumption of junk foods with negative impacts on 
health. (-) 
Increased availability and accessibility of the foods even 
during the stress periods has improved general level of 
nutrition among the member countries. (+) 
 
0 
Environmental 
outcomes 
  
Water quality  Intensification of agriculture using agricultural 
chemicals increases pollution of surface and sub-
surface water resources. (--) 
New policies and mechanisms of managing water sheds 
have led improvement of quality of water and 
protection of water resources. (+) 
Improved soil and water conservation practices 
coupled with establishment of riparian buffer strips 
between agricultural land and water bodies reduces 
sediment loads and contamination of water bodies and 
hence improved overall water quality of many water 
bodies in the EAC region. (+)  
 
0 
Soil quality  Intensification of cultivation led to the decline in the 
productivity potential of the soil requiring additional 
investments in inputs to maintain productivity (--)   
Increased deforestation and use of marginal lands for 
agriculture increased erosion from agricultural lands (-)  
Extensive promotion of technologies and good 
practices that restore/enhance soil fertility by NGOs 
and CBOs helped to some extent slow down 
degradation (+) 
 
_ _ 
Forest cover Increased demand for agriculture , biofuels has led to 
conversion of forest lands to agricultural use (-)   
The Laws and policies related to forest management 
and tourism have resulted in improved management of 
national parks and other protected areas (+)  
 
High demand for forest products from increased  
urbanisation,  and industry led to excessive logging and 
destruction of forests (--) 
Proactive afforestation programmes and se of 
agroforestry helped in restoring forest cover lost with 
agriculture, urbanisation, industry and other 
infrastructure (+) 
 
_ 
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Biodiversity status Both intensification and extensificaton of agriculture 
for mono-cropping has led to loss of agro-biodiversity 
and biodiversity more broadly (--)  
The economic importance of wildlife conservation and 
tourism has led to improved implementation of 
conservation laws and polices that contributed to 
conservation of most of the threatened and 
endangered species of plant and animals (+) 
Additional finances made available through climate 
change mitigation programmes helped in conserving 
biodiversity to limited extent (+) 
 
0 
Water sufficiency Agreement on sharing trans-boundary water resources 
led to more equitable  distribution and access to 
available water resource (+) 
Increased evapotranspiration due to increased 
temperature and changes in rainfall has reduced the 
available water (-)  
The demand for water for agriculture,  industrial and 
domestic purposes has increased (-) 
Adoption of improved agricultural water management 
technologies and practices  helped in improving the 
water use efficiency of crops and livestock systems (+) 
New water resource governance , policies and laws on 
abstraction and use of water  has increased the cost of 
water for industrial and domestic purposes (-) 
Despite good management of water sheds, the area 
under wetlands has declined (-)   
 
_ 
Social/Livelihood 
outcomes 
  
Financial wealth Increased employment opportunities due to increased 
industrialisation has improved incomes (+) 
Increased commodity prices and increased productivity 
has contributed to increased income from agriculture 
(+) 
Increased privatisation of social services has resulted in 
making public services expensive (-) 
Access to financial services  by rural people continue to 
be a constraint (-) 
 
0 
Social capital  Increased household incomes from agriculture, trade 
and value addition, have enhanced access and control 
of resources by both men and women in the society. (+) 
However, the commercial and consumer-oriented 
lifestyles deriving from the regional trade opportunities 
weaken the traditional social networks. (-)  
Conflict over resources is minimised due to good 
political stability. (+) 
Small farmers are unable to compete in high value 
chains, with outmigration the result, which sees their 
rural social networks crumble. (-) 
There is a strengthening of regional civil society 
organisations in the various sectors in the region.(+) 
 
+ 
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Health  Strong regional and national governance structures  
provide for and facilitate access to better health 
services that lead to a healthier workforce in the 
agriculture sector. (+ +) 
In spite of massive donor funding for government 
campaigns mounted in the EAC region against the 
spread of malaria to new areas due to warmer 
temperatures prove to be ineffective. (-) 
Regional and national governments invest in more 
equitable healthcare. (+) 
There are serious risks posed by new pandemics like 
swine flu and H1Ni because of more regionally 
integrated and export-oriented agriculture. (-) 
 
+ 
Knowledge and skills 
for the whole food 
system 
The improved communication infrastructure in the 
region (ICT development) has enhanced information 
dissemination leading to expanded marketing 
opportunities for agricultural commodities. (+) 
The level of knowledge and skills of people involved in 
agriculture in relation to market opportunities and 
innovations has been enhanced. (+)  
Strengthened Early Warning Systems have reduced 
risks and improved performance in the line sectors. (+) 
Farmer support agencies have been empowered 
through better access to ICTs  to provide better 
advisory services leading to a steady increase in 
productivity. (+) 
The region has gained tremendously from new Science 
& Technology products such as Biotechnology. (+) 
Indigenous traditional knowledge in agriculture will be 
eroded. (-) 
 
+ + 
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SCENARIO 2:  REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REACTIVE: Analysis of FSEL variables 
 
FSEL variables  Description of change Net effect (2030) 
Food Security   
Affordability of staple 
food 
In 2030, there are more established agribusiness 
industries and the region is exporting most of the 
processed and raw food and the region sustained 
economic growth of 10% which led to increased sources 
of and levels of house hold income. (++) 
So even though there is food security in the region, 
locally produced food prices are quite high and because 
of inequity in distribution of the wealth in the region, 
40% of the population (rural poor & unskilled labourers 
in the urban areas) are still poor and are unable to 
afford locally produced food. (--)   
As a result the governments imported cheaper and 
substandard food of which is affordable by the poor. (+)   
Due to increased urbanisation, the region experiences a 
shift in food consumption habits with the urban 
population dependent more on processed food while 
the rural population depends largely on fresh and 
unprocessed staple foods. (+) 
 
+ + 
 
 
 
Regional Production of 
local food 
The region experienced an increase in temperature by 1 
C by 2030 and this led to a decline of staple food crops 
by 5%. (--)  
The private sectors increased investment in 
mechanization, application of agro-chemicals, GMOs, 
agricultural intensification, agribusiness, extension and 
advisory services between 2015-2030. (++)   
Over this period there was an increase in the number of 
people moving from the rural areas to urban centres 
and this led to a decrease in labour availability 
rural/production areas. At the same time there was an 
increase in learning education enrollement.(-)   
Farmers shifted to grow drought resistance crops with 
high values like bio-fuel crops for earning cash.(-) 
With the commitment of governments in the region to 
promote economic growth (to at least 15%) there was 
diversification of land uses particularly non-agricultural 
activities like industries, mining and urbanization.(-) 
However the region was still a major food exporter with 
60% of the food imported by the Arab world sourced 
from East Africa.(-) 
 
_ _ 
Effectiveness of 
distribution 
mechanisms 
There is improved and interconnected infrastructure 
with better roads, railways, energy, telecommuni-
cations, food storage facilities, ports, air transport, 
water and coastal inland navigation.(++)  
However, due to the high food prices and the lack of 
attention the reserves will not be inadequately stocked 
(-).   
 
+ + 
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Despite efforts for regional integration there was 
limited flexible trade and tariffs for regional movement 
of food items due to political reluctance.(-) 
Increasing urbanisation was a major driver in the 
processing and value addition of most perishable food 
products.(++) 
Nutritional value The tendency in the region to increase food production 
saw an increase in the use of agro chemicals which 
reduced food quality and some cases of food poisoning 
eg. Aflotoxin for local food.(--)  
The introduction and acceptance of region biosafety 
policy regime between 2010-2030 led to production of 
fortified food crops and livestock for both local and 
export market.(++) 
There will be access and use of diversified agricultural 
commodities due to free movement of people within 
the region and led to increase of nutritional staple 
crops.(++) 
During the periods of stress/prolonged drought (2017, 
2022, 2027) the governments imported substandard 
food products.(-)  
 
+ 
Environmental 
outcomes 
  
Water quality Due to agricultural intensification and inadequate 
environmental governance, there is increased in 
environmental degradation, water contamination and 
pollution. (--) 
Improper management of agro-chemicals by peasant 
and commercial farmers near the lake shores, as well as 
improper management of effluents from the industries 
have increased lake and river pollution by 30% and by 
2024 have affected 60% of the ecosystems in the 
region. (-).  
The eventual response from governments is to focus on 
regulation of key watersheds and make concerted 
efforts to rehabilitate these. (+) 
 
_ _ 
 
Soil quality Improper management of agro-chemicals and 
unregulated cultivation of crops has led to soil 
contamination and degradation. (-)   
The opening up of new land for agriculture has 
exacerbated soil erosion.  Monoculture, mechanisation 
and  reduction in fallow periods has reduced the quality 
of soils. (-) 
But the regional body tasked with soil management 
reacts to this situation and by 2030 is working with 
CBOs and farmers, making made great strides in 
implementing soil conservation programmes (+) 
 
_  
Forest cover Deforestation and land clearing is widely practiced as 
the need for land grows every year for agriculture, 
infrastructure development, industry and 
urbanization/settlement and hence the rate of 
 
_ _ 
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deforestation is still increasing.(--)  
Each of the countries in the region has a forest 
conservation policy and legislation although with poor 
implementation.(-)  
The region is still on discussion on the application of 
REDD plus as a response towards climate change 
impact.(+) 
Biodiversity status Encroachment into biodiversity hot spots is common 
practice as the need for land grows every year for 
agriculture, infrastructure development, industry and 
urbanisation/settlement and hence the rate of 
degradation and loss of biodiversity is increasing.(--) 
Each of the countries in the region has a biodiversity 
frame work and are all parties to the convention of 
biological diversity and there is some efforts on regional 
biodiversity conservation approach due to the pressure 
from international and local based private sectors.(+) 
The region is still on discussion and formulating a 
regional financing mechanism.(+)  
 
0 
Water sufficiency Water is one the common resources that binds 
countries in the region together for eg. Lake Victoris, 
Lake Tanganyika, Mara river, River Kagera and Lake 
Turkana. In recognition to the importance of this trans 
boundary resources the region has formulated policies, 
strategies and regulations on the conservation 
management and funding.(+)  
Due to reactive nature of the governments the region 
has experienced a reduction on water availability from 
these sources.(--) 
Changing and variable climate has reduced water 
sufficiency and this is exacerbated by inadequate 
climate mitigation response from the region.(--) 
With the focus to enhance economic growth there has 
been an increase in competing use of water in all 
sectors.(-)  
The expansionist approach to agriculture production in 
the region compromise on the sanctity of wetland and 
watershed as important waters towers in the region.(--)   
 
_ _ 
Social/ livelihood 
outcomes 
  
Financial wealth Increase in industrialisation and commercialisation of 
agriculture sector led to an increase in urban 
population, levels of employment and distribution of 
assets (and therefore income), although unevenly. (+) 
Increase in agricultural productivity and profitability 
from trade and value addition led to increase in the 
cost of living, in community / household incomes, and 
have implications on the level of marginalisation of the 
poor by the rich.(-) 
Governments in the region pay sufficient attention to 
social services due to economic growth.(++) 
 
+ + 
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There are increase in the affordability and access to 
financial services by farmers (supplied by private 
sector/govt).(+) 
Social capital Increase in household incomes from agriculture, trade 
and value addition, have led to a increase in access and 
control of resources by both men and women in the 
society.(++) 
Commercial and consumer-oriented lifestyles deriving 
from the regional trade opportunities have a negative 
impact on the traditional social networks.(-) 
Conflict over resources and continued political 
instability affect social capital negatively.(-) 
There is an increase in migration of people looking for 
employment opportunities and resources (old 
networks are threatened but new social networks are 
created). (+) 
 
+ 
Health Improvement of regional and national governance 
structures development of regional health programs 
and access to health services. (++) 
The increase spread of malaria and other related 
diseases to new areas due to warmer temperatures and 
reactiveness of the region posed a challenge to 
government in the region.(-) 
There are increase in access to private health care, 
increasing the disparity in health between the rich and 
the poor. Heavy investment by the Asian powers and 
European countries enables the middle-classes to pay 
for healthcare.(+) 
There are serious risks posed by new pandemics like 
swine flu and H1N1 because of more regionally 
integrated and export-oriented agriculture or weaker 
government disease surveillance systems.(-) 
 
+ 
Knowledge and skills 
for the whole food 
system 
The increase in communication infrastructure in the 
region (ICT development) has led to changes in 
information dissemination and marketing 
opportunities for agricultural commodities. (++) 
There are increase in the level of knowledge and skills 
of people involved in agriculture, in relation to market 
opportunities and innovations, such as processing, 
etc.(++) 
Increase in the applications of Early Warning Systems 
had influenced the level of risks management and 
performance in the various sectors.(++)  
There were increase in the level of support to farmers 
agencies and advisory services.(++) 
The increased  level of adoption of new Science & 
Technology products such as Biotechnology influenced 
the agricultural productivity.(++) 
Decrease in Revitalisation and conservation of 
indigenous/traditional knowledge in agriculture.(--) 
 
+ + 
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SCENARIO 3: STATUS QUO AND PROACTIVE: Analysis of FSEL variables 
 
FSEL variables  Description of change Net effect (2030) 
Food Security   
Affordability Decrease in level of income in relation to the projected 
economic growth especially for the rural people who 
depend on agriculture as their source of income. (-)  
Increase in the price of staple foods due to changes in 
demand for food locally and globally. (- -) 
The gap between rich and poor widens, making food 
expensive. (-) 
Affordability goes down by 20% for most people, 
including the urban poor. (- -) 
In an attempt to increase food availability, governments 
in some countries use foreign earnings to increase food 
imports to make food available at reasonable prices. (+) 
_ _ 
Regional Production Decrease in agricultural labor due to migration, 
education, and urbanisation, so production of staple 
foods declines by 30%. (- -)  
Decrease in availability of land for agricultural 
production due to changes in land use dynamics that 
include non-agricultural activities like industrial, mining, 
urbanisation, forestry. (-)  
EAC has improved agricultural strategies in place and 
some movement on the Maputo resolution on 
investment in agriculture, but none of the countries has 
attained the set target. (0) 
Donor community/CS/NGOs/Private sector are 
proactively and strategically promoting agricultural 
production. (+) 
Regional production by foreign companies is high, but in 
cash crops for export. (-) 
Farmer prefer to grow cash and/or food crops 
(including bio-fuel) for export. (-) 
 
_ _ 
Effectiveness of 
distribution 
mechanisms 
Transport infrastructure in the region has improved 
markedly (roads, markets, market information etc) to 
move goods freely within the region from areas suitable 
for growing different crops and also from areas with 
plenty to deficit areas), as Asian Powers have 
contributed to building infrastructure. (+ +) 
Some governments are proactive in trying to ensure 
food distribution to areas of high need, but effective 
demand is weak especially in rural areas. (0) 
Ability of the member countries to create buffer stocks 
of staple crops remains stagnant.(-) 
Donor organisations proactively help individual 
countries to overcome the food gap through loans and 
aid. (+) 
 
+  
Nutritional value There is less access to nutritious food, because cash-
cropping for export increases. (-)  
For both the rural and urban poor, meal frequencies 
 
_ _ 
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decline and nutritional status deteriorates. (-) 
On the whole, people in the region are more concerned 
with food quantity at the expense of quality food. (-) 
Food quality goes down for example because of 
widespread importing of low quality foods. (-) 
Environmental 
outcomes 
  
Water quality The quality of water for agriculture and for the rural 
poor declines as a result of agricultural intensification, 
deforestation and the use of agro-chemicals. (-) 
There is an increase in provision of potable water and 
sanitation due to urbanisation in the region, matched 
by investments in efficient water purification systems. 
(+) 
The proactive efforts ensure the enacting of policies 
and strategies on water quality and access. (+) 
 
+ 
Soil quality There is a decrease in area under forests and other 
cover, and thus soil productivity and fertility decline 
due to erosion. (- -) 
Regional and individual governments are aware of the 
problem and proactively address the issue through 
putting appropriate plans in place. (+)  
Regional alliances of NGOs and CS are proactive in 
encouraging the rural population to adopt technologies 
and good practices that restore/enhance soil fertility 
and ensure sustainable agriculture (+)  
 
0 
Forest cover There is some increase in forest area in some of the 
countries, as a result of afforestation programmes in 
response to climate change from mitigation funds. (+) 
But across the region, there is a net decrease in forest 
cover in the region due to land use changes as a result 
of expansion of agriculture, urban sprawl and 
settlements, and the expansion of industrial 
infrastructure. (- -) 
There are forest conservation laws and policies in each 
country (management and harvesting/logging), but 
individual countries are slow to implement these. (-) 
CS and NGOs proactive encouraging better 
management of hot-spot forest reserves through 
community based environmental protection efforts. (+) 
 
_ 
Biodiversity status There is a decrease in biodiversity due to increase in 
temperature, drought, floods, and change in land use as 
a result of agriculture expansion, urbanisation / 
settlements, industries, infrastructure and water 
pollution. (- -) 
Regional and individual countries are proactive in 
revising the strategies to renew and conserve the loss 
of biodiversity by 10%, there is an increase in financing 
biodiversity programs under pressure of climate 
change. (+) 
 
_ 
Water sufficiency Decrease in overall , water availability by 20% due to  
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changing climatic patterns (decrease in rainfall and 
increase in temperature), increased human populations 
and other competing uses of water, including irrigation, 
industrial, domestic, livestock, urbanisation and power 
generation. (-) 
EAC strive to increase the level of agricultural 
intensification through use of new practices and 
technologies (water intensive crops, water use 
efficiency, water harvesting strategies/systems.(+) 
Individual governments, supported by Asian 
superpower technology and global funds are proactive 
in introducing and promoting irrigated agriculture. (+) 
There are changes in water resource governance i.e 
policies, laws on abstraction, uses, pricing, conservation 
of wetlands and watersheds, improving soil cover. (+) 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social/ livelihood 
outcomes 
  
Financial wealth There is a decrease in income levels among rural and 
urban informal dwellers by 30%, because of constrained 
income sources. (- -) 
The EAC strives to increase agricultural productivity and 
profitability from trade and value addition to reduce the 
cost of living, and increase community / household 
incomes (+) 
EAC countries strive to increase the level of 
industrialisation and commercialisation of agriculture 
sector to create employment and therefore income 
levels (+) 
However, governments in the region do/do not pay 
sufficient attention to social services e.g. minimum 
wage, social security, public services etc. (-) 
There is a decrease the affordability and access to 
financial services by farmers, which are supplied by 
private sector. (-) 
Individual governments, CSOs/NGOs are active in 
propping up livelihoods through welfare efforts. (+) 
 
_ 
Social capital The decrease in household incomes from agriculture, 
puts strain on the relations between men and women, 
and between the rich and the poor in the society. (-) 
The increased migration of people to urban centres 
looking for employment opportunities, weakens 
kinship-based social networks. (-) 
There is an increase in conflict over resources and 
continued political instability. (-) 
 
 
_ _ 
 
 
Health Because of changes in climate, EAC countries 
experience more frequent and widespread disease 
epidemics like malaria and Rift Valley Fever. (-) 
Because of private sector control of export agriculture, 
new pandemics like swine flu and H1N1 pose a serious 
risk. (-) 
EAC in collaboration with donor community and the 
 
0  
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private sector proactively take measures to control 
epidemics like cholera through better water 
management (+) 
Health-care provision in general improves, because 
economic growth allows for investment in vaccinations 
and primary health care facilities (+)   
Knowledge and skills for 
the whole food system 
The improvement in communication infrastructure and 
in the adoption of biotechnology in the region has led 
to improved productivity, information dissemination 
and marketing opportunities for agricultural 
commodities. (+)  
But there is a divide between the hi-tech sector and the 
low-input sector, where stagnation is serious. (-) 
NGOs and donor countries have campaigns to support, 
mobilise and educate organisations and communities in 
the region on the food system (+)   
 
+ 
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SCENARIO 4 : STATUS QUO AND REACTIVE: Analysis of FSEL variables 
FSEL variables  Description of change Net effect (2030) 
Food security   
Affordability Because the Asian powers control 30% of the land, 
employment opportunities have increased for many 
involved in the agricultural sector. Consequently, 
incomes have gone up in line with these employment 
opportunities.(+)  
Food prices have increased because the Asian powers 
are exporting food and there is an increase in 
international demand. (-)  
The weak institutional and governance framework (no 
price control, subsidies, no good import policies) has 
lead to price increase. (-) 
Climate shocks have led to lower supply and hence 
increased food prices. (-) 
 
_ _ 
Regional Production Low regional economic integration and political 
instability resulted in low aggregate regional 
production because governments are more concerned 
with solving internal political problems rather with 
improving regional production.(-) 
Weakened common markets result in low incentives 
for increasing production. (-) 
Local people gain from opportunities to learn skills 
and modern technologies from the strong Asian 
economies to improve their production efficiency. (+) 
The private investments promote urban migration 
which robs the rural area of labour leading to decline 
in agricultural productivity. (-) 
_ _ 
Effectiveness of 
distribution 
mechanisms 
Most governments focus more on giving their 
countries a total urban facelift in terms of 
communication and transport infrastructure, creating 
a conducive environment for private sector 
investments and foreign direct investments. This 
increases the movement of goods within the 
individual countries from areas suitable for growing 
different crops and also from areas with plenty to 
deficit areas. (+) 
The absence of transparent and democratic systems in 
the region has negatively affected the ability of 
individual country to create a buffer stock of staple 
crops.(--) 
Due to growing hunger and poor distribution of food 
especially in arid and semi-arid areas, civil society 
movements increase the pressure on governments to 
improve food distribution.(+) 
By 2030 there is still no agreement on a common 
market, currency or political leadership in the region. 
This impedes the movement of goods and services 
including food items. ( -) 
 
_ 
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Nutritional value Greater employment opportunities in agriculture, has 
led to increases in income among agriculture workers 
who are now spending more on nutritional food. (+)  
The weak credit institutions compel the smallholders 
to depend on savings from their low incomes, which in 
turn curtails their use of fertilisers, modern seed 
varieties and other farming inputs. They end up 
practicing more of low-input, vegetables and other 
healthy foods. (+) 
Lack of implementation of good food policies 
including biosafety policies leads to production of 
unsafe foods.(-) 
Famine and drought undermine purchasing power and 
cheap imported grain affects the nutritional value of 
food. (-) 
 
0 
Environmental 
Outcomes 
  
Water quality Intensification of agriculture by Asian superpowers 
and foreign MNCs leads to eutrophication and silting. 
(- -) 
By 2030, Uganda and Tanzania have joined forces to 
revisit the Lake Victoria Basin Management 
Memorandum of Understanding to make it more 
binding. This results in less pollution and runoff. (+) 
 
_ 
Soil Quality Intensification by MNCs means more nutrient 
mining.(-) 
Increased use of agro-chemicals leads to leaching and 
higher soil salinity.(-) 
Extensification driven by marginalised population 
leads to soil erosion on steep hillsides.(-) 
Sustainable agricultural practices and technologies by 
environmentally and socially responsible corporations 
maintain soil quality in some areas (+). 
 
_ _ 
Forest cover Extensive demand for increased food by population 
growth and foreign investors reduces forest cover.(-) 
High demand of forest products and uncontrolled 
forest harvest reduce forest cover. (-)  
There is an increased forest cover due to participation 
in REDD agreements and programmes by 2030. (+) 
Civil society movements puts a continuous pressure to 
governments to respond to climate change and 
address issues that will  increase forest cover (+) 
 
0 
Biodiversity status Urbanisation and expansion of roads have cut through 
National parks, affecting the biodiversity status. (-) 
Agriculture extensification has diminished the level of 
biodiversity.(-) 
Involvement and financing of the governments in 
actions that  increased forest cover that led to greater 
conservation of biodiversity, especially in biodiversity 
hot-spots.(+) 
 
 
 
_ _ 
Water sufficiency Climate change make dry areas drier, lowering water _ _ 
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tables. (--) 
The increased interest by Uganda and Kenya to 
improve water quality in Lake Victoria has lead to 
policies that promote better distribution among states 
around Lake Victoria.(+) 
Political instability and population growth has 
increased conflict between end users and undermined 
water supply.(--) 
Social/Livelihood 
outcomes 
  
Financial wealth Because MNCs invest heavily in agriculture, access to 
credit and crop insurance is more prominent for 
politicians and big farmers, but everyone else is 
poorer.(-) 
Low productivity due to weakened common market, 
climate variability, political instability and poor 
governance leads low household/ community income, 
employment and limited access to assets  to the small 
scale farmers. (-) 
 
_ _ 
Social capital Low household/ community incomes due to low 
productivity limited access and control of resources by 
smallholder farmers. (-) 
People/communities are more divided/fragmented 
due to political instability. (-) 
There is strengthening of the existing regional civil 
society organisations as a result of them making 
common cause in the various sectors in the region.(+) 
The private investments in agriculture promote urban 
migration which threatens established social networks 
but promotes the creation of new networks (0)   
 
_ 
Health The situation in countries – famines, political crises, 
insecurity – all result in deteriorating health for the 
majority of people. (- - ) 
Heavy investment by the Asian powers and European 
countries enables the middle-classes to pay for private 
healthcare. (+) 
Donors provide more funding on health (malaria, 
HIV/AIDS) especially by 2015 when MDG targets were 
set to be revisited.(+) 
 
0 
Knowledge and skills 
for the whole food 
system 
Improved knowledge and skills on food production 
systems as a result of investments by Asian powers, 
Brazil, Russia and South Africa, but this is confined to a 
relatively small group.(+) 
The initiative by IGAD to establish Early Warning 
Centres reduces the levels of risk and increases 
performance in the production systems. (+) 
The low public expenditure on agriculture is a grave 
concern given the inadequacy of rural infrastructure 
technology and the need for functional extension 
services. (-) 
+ 
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8. Plotting the Spider Diagrams 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
  
  
 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
The position on each axis represents the change in that variable by 2030 from current, which is 
represented by the zero line. 
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9. Some thoughts on the pros and cons of using this approach   
 
Scen WS2 was designed to help structure the discussion of a highly complex topic and as 
such, extensive ‘Health Warnings’ are required when engaging critically with these 
preliminary outputs. In relation to the spider diagrams, it should be noted that: 
 
 The choice of which statements to make for each cell (how you unpack each of the 
13 FSEL outcomes) was not standardised across scenarios;  
 The assigning of +tive and –tive to each statement was achieved through consensus 
within scenario working groups, not between the groups; 
 The overall values on the axes are ‘net’ values of the 3-4 statements in each cell, 
each of which were assigned a +tive or –tive;  
 The derivation of the net value was also by consensus within the groups, i.e. not 
through a standardised procedure: these net values are not arithmetic means and at 
this stage do not accurately reflect the different weightings of each statement. This 
will require more quantification; 
 The axes are all very different ‘currencies’ (i.e. they are not directly comparable to 
each other); 
 The position along the different axes are not proportional (i.e. a ‘+2’ on one axis is 
not twice ‘+1’ on another axis); 
 The overall shape of the polygon is dependent on the order in which one positions 
the axes. 
 
It should be remembered that these are the outputs of a mere 4.5 days of intensive work by 
a small group of participants, the vast majority of whom had never been involved in 
scenarios development before. Nevertheless, these scenarios, the narratives that underpin 
them and the analysis of FSEL variables that inform the spider diagrams, represent the 
focused efforts of a group of committed regional stakeholders in East Africa. As such, it is 
worth noting that: 
 
 This type of analysis is indicative, not absolute and the narratives will be subjected to 
further checks for internal consistency and plausibility;  
 The diagrams and the scenarios they represent are based on expert opinion, not 
quantitative modelling input; 
 They do not represent what will happen, but rather what could happen given a 
range of agreed assumptions about future uncertainties. 
 The quantitative modelling of the FSEL variables may be challenging in that they 
represent composites of a range of factors, but not impossible. 
 
While the shapes and values of individual diagrams should not be taken as an absolute 
measure or statement of change from the baseline (2010) to 2030, there are a number of 
benefits to this approach. By comparing of the diagrams, both in terms of overall area and 
shape and axis-by-axis, (e.g. how food affordability differs between scenarios), one gets a 
visual indication of how: 
 
1. the outcomes differ overall between scenarios 
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2. trade-offs between the 13 FSEL outcomes differ within a given scenario  
3. trade-offs between the 3 groups of FSEL outcomes differ between scenarios   
 
More importantly, the process for developing these prototype scenarios allows a wide-
ranging discussion by varied stakeholders of what will affect developments of interest to 
CCAFS and thereby promoted creative thinking “outside the box”. It also led to the group 
developing a sense of joint ownership and commitment to collaborate which can be built-
upon in taking forward the CCAFS agenda in the region. 
 
10. Conclusions  
 
It is through intense discussion with each other and sustained engagement with the 
scenarios development process that the foundation has been laid for key stakeholders from 
different sectors in East Africa to begin to explore common understandings of the future, to 
test their own assumptions and those of others and, in the process, to find ways to work 
effectively together. Their capacity to take an active part in future policy processes in the 
region, to have the tools discuss viable future adaptation options and to assist with building 
the capacity of the many other stakeholders in the food system, have all been enhanced. 
Indeed, a key objective of the process of developing these scenarios has been to build a 
dialogue and a network that radiates outwards from the initial core group of people to 
eventually encompass all the key stakeholders in the regional food system in taking the 
CCAFS agenda forward.  
 
One key outcome of the scenario development process thus far is enhanced communication 
to help the policy community understand how climate change will interact with other 
drivers in a future East Africa. Another outcome is the provision of innovative tools to help 
decision-makers, operating under conditions of uncertainty, to explore future trajectories of 
change.  
 
The next steps in the development of the regional scenarios in East Africa are to: 
 
 Refine the narratives, checking for internal consistency; and re-develop  the spider 
diagrams using a common set of elements within each outcome variable across 
each scenario; 
 Hold a high-level stakeholder engagement workshop involving key EA stakeholders 
– including both policymakers and the private sectors and CCAFS Theme Leaders to 
discuss (Scen WS3); 
 Undertake an iteration of the scenarios through discussions and critical feedback 
from a wider range of regional expert group and institutions; 
 Engage the quantitative modelling community to explore ways of modelling the 
FSEL variables in ways that are useful to CCAFS research priorities (Scen WS4). 
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Annex One:  List of participants in Nairobi (Scen WS1) 
 
No Name Title Organisation Country 
1 Wilfred Mariki Principal Agriculture 
Research Officer 
SELIAN ARI Tanzania 
2 Charles Lyamchai Principal Agriculture 
Research Officer 
SELIAN ARI Tanzania 
3 Geoffrey Onyango AFOLU Advisor CARE International Kenya, regional 
4 Menghestab Haile Policy Advisor UN WFP Regional 
5 Eldad Tukahirwa Deputy Executive 
Director 
ASARECA Regional 
6 Kidane Georgis Researcher EIAR Ethiopia 
7 Habatamu Admassu CC Researcher EIAR Ethiopia 
8 Caroline Kilembe Principal Agricultural 
Officer 
Min of Agriculture, 
Food Security & 
Cooperatives 
Tanzania 
9 Anna Mwangamilo Agricultural Engineer Min of Agriculture, 
Food Security & 
Cooperatives 
Tanzania 
10 Michael S.Z. Nkalugo Commissioner for 
Meteorology 
Min of Water & 
Environment 
Uganda 
11 Mponda Malozo Agricultural Officer Min of Agriculture, 
Food Security & 
Cooperatives 
Tanzania 
12 Christine Jost Consultant CCAFS Regional   
13 Andrew Ainslie Scenarios Officer CCAFS CCAFS 
14 Kevin Coffey Science Officer IRI Columbia CCAFS 
15 Patrick K. Ketiem Researcher KARI Kenya 
16 Kennedy Okello Were Research Officer KARI Kenya 
17  Moushumi Chaudhury Social Scientist ICRAF CCAFS 
18 Sarah Mubiru Programme Assistant, 
L/stock & Fisheries 
Program 
ASARECA Regional 
19 Hezron Mogaka Manager, NRM & B ASARECA Regional 
20 Jacqueline Nyagahima Head, Info & Comm 
Unit 
ASARECA Regional 
21 Joseph Methu Head, Partnership & 
Capacity 
ASARECA Regional 
22 Polly Ericksen Senior Scientist ILRI Regional 
26 Mercy Mwangi Junior Professional 
Officer 
Forest Action 
Network 
Kenya 
27 John Ingram Executive Officer University of Oxford 
GECAFS 
CCAFS 
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28 Pauline Nantongo Executive Director ECOTRUST Uganda 
29 Geletu Bejiga Country Manager ICARDA Ethiopia 
30 James Kamunge Programme Officer UN-WFP Regional 
31 Kinyangi Kevin Kinusu Programme Officer 
Climate Change 
KENFAP Kenya 
32 Saikoba Ahmed Programme Advisor UN-WFP Regional 
33 Jafari Chobo Meteorological 
Supervisor 
Tanzania 
Meteorological 
Agency 
Tanzania 
34 Philip Thorton Theme Leader CCAFS ILRI CCAFS 
35 Tilahun Amede Nile Basin Leader ILRI/WMI/CPWI Ethiopia/Regional 
36 K.P.C. Rao Principal Scientist ICRISAT Regional 
37 Robinson Ngugi 
Kinuthia 
 University of Nairobi Kenya/Regional 
38 Cromwel Lukorito Lecturer/Researcher UON/ ICPAC Kenya/Regional 
39 Harun Warui Coordinator, 
Environment 
KARI Kenya 
40 Kristoffer Welsien Programme Officer UN-WFP Regional 
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Annex Three: List of participants in Dar es Salaam (Scen WS2) 
 
No. Name Title/Designation Organisation 
1.  Wilfred Mariki Principal Agri Research 
Officer,  Conservation Agric 
SELIAN ARI, Arusha,  
 
2.  Habtamu Admassu CC Researcher EIAR, Ethiopia 
3.  Hurbert Lyimo Co-ordinator, Livestock Feed 
Resources Research 
Min. Of Livestock Dev & Fisheries, 
Tanzania 
4.  Prosper Makundi Agricultural Officer Min. Of Livestock Dev & Fisheries, 
Tanzania 
5.  Caroline Kilembe Principal Agric Officer Min of Agric. Food Security and 
Cooperatives, Tanzania 
6.  Anna Mwangamilo Agricultural Engineer Min of Agric. Food Security and 
Cooperatives, Tanzania 
7.  Patrick Ketiem Environmental Researcher KARI, Mombasa, Kenya 
8.  Moushumi Chaudhury Social Scientist, CCAFS ICRAF, Nairobi, Kenya 
9.  Hezron Mogaka Manager, NRM &B  
Programme 
ASARECA, Entebbe, Uganda 
10.  Jacqueline Nyagahima Head, Info and Comm Unit ASARECA, Entebbe, Uganda 
11.  Pauline Nantongo Executive Director ECOTRUST, Kampala, Uganda 
12.  Kevin Kinyangi Programme Officer, Climate 
Change 
KENFAP, Nairobi, Kenya 
13.  K.P.C. Rao Principal Scientist ICRISAT, Nairobi, Kenya 
14.  Cromwel Lukorito  Researcher Univ of Nairobi, ICPAC, Kenya 
15.  Farai Kapfudzaruwa Doctoral researcher UCT, Cape Town, South Africa 
16.  Philip Thornton CCAFS Theme Leader ILRI, Nairobi, Kenya 
17.  Mario Herrero Researcher/Modeller ILRI, Nairobi, Kenya 
18.  James Kinyangi CCAFS Regional FAcilitator ILRI, Nairobi, Kenya 
19.  Chipo Mubaya START-Fellow IRA-Univ.DSM, Tanzania 
20.  Chimwemwe 
Chamdimba 
Regional Co-ordinator, AU-
Nepad 
Nairobi and Pretoria 
21.  John Ingram CCAFS Scenarios Team  ECI, Oxford, UK 
22.  Polly Ericksen Senior Scientist, CCAFS 
Scenarios Team 
ILRI, Nairobi, Kenya 
23.  Andrew Ainslie CCAFS Scenarios Officer  ECI, Oxford, UK 
24.  Pius Yanda Director IRA-Univ.DSM, Tanzania 
APOLOGIES for WORKSHOP, BUT CONTRIBUTED TO POST-WORKSHOP WRITING 
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1.  Harun Warui National Coordinator of 
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Programme Kenya 
Agricultural Research 
Institute (KARI)  
Coordinator, Climate Change 
Unit, KARI 
KARI, Nairobi, Kenya 
2.  Tilahun Amede IWMI/ILRI Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
3.  Kennedy Were Research Officer KARI, Nairobi, Kenya 
4.  Mponda Malozo Scientist Min of Agric. Food Security and 
Cooperatives, Tanzania 
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Annex Four: The prototype East African scenarios 
 
Scenario 1: Regional Integration and Proactive: Narrative 
 
The global situation (Introduction) 
 
By 2030, the world is increasingly interdependent and countries in regional blocs have 
become more united. Common economic and political policy formulation that spread the 
benefits of economic growth as widely as possible, have become the norm. This is evidenced 
by the emergence of effective regional groupings such as the East African Community (EAC). 
Numerous interventions have been put in place at regional level to develop and replicate 
appropriate strategies that ensure resilience of national as well as regional economies. 
 
The reinvigorated World Trade Organisation (WTO) effected a major economic 
breakthrough in 2015, by overseeing the removal of trade-related barriers in developed 
countries, notably the EU, and increasing trade subsidies to developing regions. This led to 
increased competitiveness for the agricultural output from African countries. Consequently, 
global food demand and prices increased by 10% and 20% respectively, expanding the 
market for agricultural commodities sourced from the EAC. However, although the high 
food prices on the international markets help EAC producers and exporters, they limit food 
access by local people who are not yet part of the global economy.  
 
Integration 
 
This narrative depicts a vibrant East African regional bloc in 2030 that has a combined 
population of more than 320 million and a regional economy that has grown at an average 
of 6% per annum for the past 12 years. The EAC is reaping the benefits of nearly two 
decades of intense focus on strengthening the ties between member states through a 
common market, a common customs tariff and a range of public services so as to achieve 
balanced economic growth within the region. Political and economic unification has 
bolstered the capacity of the EAC to stand its ground in international negotiating forums. As 
a result of these initiatives, the quality of life of the people of the East Africa Community has 
improved through the increased competitiveness of their agricultural commodities, value 
added production, expanded trade and considerably greater domestic and foreign 
investment within the region. 
 
The political union of the 8 member states of the EAC happened incrementally to form a 
unified bloc in 2030. In 2011, five member states, namely, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Republic of Rwanda and Republic of Burundi had completely acceded to the EAC Treaty. The 
referendum held in Sudan in January 2013 created a new independent state, the Southern 
Sudan. Kenya had spearheaded the long mediation process between Northern and Southern 
Sudan, which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi. 
The close relationship of the new state (Southern Sudan) with Kenya enabled Southern 
Sudan to join the EAC as early as 2016. Owing to earlier disagreements over the utilisation 
of some natural resources (in particular, water) with neighbouring countries such as Kenya, 
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Ethiopia delayed joining the EAC until 2020, when all agreements and policies relating to the 
resources had been agreed upon and harmonised. Somalia, the most unstable country (with 
civil strife lasting over two decades) was the last country to join the EAC in 2029, after the 
establishment of strong mechanisms by the EAC and the international community to 
guarantee lasting peace in that country.   
 
The governance of EAC continued to strengthen, in proportion to the consolidation of 
internal democracy and governance within member states. Member states carried out 
internal constitutional reviews to align the governance requirements/expectations of the 
region. Kenya successfully completed its constitutional review in 2012, while other member 
states had completed similar reviews in succession by 2020. The high transparency and 
accountability requirement in leadership in the region has been reflected in regular, free 
and fair elections where the internal democratic processes and human rights of citizens are 
guaranteed and universally respected. The independent regional judicial system established 
in 2018, with the High Court of the EAC situated in Arusha, has come to underpin regional as 
well as national economic integration and growth. The freedom of the press and of 
association as anchored in the respective country constitutions, is assiduously monitored 
and upheld by the High Court. No discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or state 
of origin in matters between persons and states is countenanced. The effective governance 
in the EAC incorporates a disciplined security system in which professionalism and good 
remuneration packages for the military and police services were entrenched by 2017. This 
facilitated the free movement of goods and services within the EAC region in an efficient 
manner, because corruption was cut to a minimum. 
 
In December 2015, the new integration agenda saw the creation of a monetary union with 
the East African shilling as common currency. By December 2022, the common market was 
extended to a political union, with an East African Federation brought into being and the 
election of the first, common East African President. 
 
Success breeds success, and member states - with the backing of their populations and the 
international community - continued allocating evermore resources to building the EAC as 
the benefits of integration noticeably improved people’s livelihoods. In 2024, strong 
commitments to poverty reduction were voiced by all member state governments as their 
number one priority. 
 
Regional integration, common markets and a common currency helped open borders with 
fewer trade barriers and tariffs on goods. The same was true of the lifting of restrictions on 
employment and the movement of labour. The strong trade-related phytosanitary 
regulations adopted by the EAC in 2020, although very costly to institute and to manage, 
ensures that the free movement of food and food products did not spread diseases, pests, 
viruses and weeds across the region, a move that could have otherwise jeopardised efforts 
geared towards attainment of food security, wealth creation and poverty reduction. 
Regional Trade Agreements with other regional blocs became instruments of choice for the 
EAC in the 2020s, as it sought to reduce trade barriers, encourage investment and improve 
transparency in the market for goods and services. Regional integration also alleviated the 
market constraints by buffering producers against production constraints and severe price 
shocks, by improving access to market intelligence.  
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Economic integration has allowed for the establishment of uniform trade tariffs for all 
imports into the EAC. This has resulted in significant increases in the volume of goods traded 
in the region that in turn led to cumulative GDP growth. These tariffs are reviewed from 
time to time in accordance with the economic growth achieved within EAC and in individual 
member countries. At the same time, business operators benefit greatly from the easier and 
faster trade opportunities across borders. 
 
Travel between countries in the EAC is hassle-free as citizens are free to travel without visas. 
In 2030, the free movement of labour and absence of work permits for nationals of member 
states has meant expanded employment opportunities and improved household incomes 
and quality of life, especially for the better educated households within the EAC. The 
harmonised social security benefits across member states mean that people had little 
incentive to move from one state to another for reasons other than work. All these benefits 
cost money, however, and the EAC is continually trying to raise more funds from its member 
countries and through higher taxation. The free movement of labour has resulted in an 
uneven distribution of educated professionals in the EAC region, with a concentration of 
doctors, teachers and scientists in urban centres like Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Addis 
Ababa. This threatens the stated policy of balanced socio-economic development in the 
region, but does support the emergence of an East African identity among the professional 
classes. Tanzania, for example, has benefited tremendously from the influx of better-
educated Kenyan professionals and workers.  
 
Financial integration was expanded in 2025 to include the listing of publically traded 
companies on a regional stock exchange in Kampala. With regard to foreign investments, 
common policies on the influx, trade and other investments from the East were developed 
and harmonised by 2015 to take full advantage of the beneficial aspects of the investments 
by Asian powers especially in the area of production and processing technologies, and 
communication and information technology. During the 2020s, trade agreements were 
signed with several countries with fast growing economies including Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa.  
 
In 2030, twenty years of regional integration of the East African Community (EAC) and the 
proactive approach of the regional leadership has fostered both co-operation and 
competition. It has led to institutional subsidiarity, access to wider markets via trade, larger 
and diversified investments and efficient production systems. It has translated into socio-
economic improvements, far greater political stability and increased bargaining power for 
the member countries and the region. The benefits of the integration are broad and include 
free movement of goods and services, capital and labour across borders, centralised socio-
economic policy development, significant harmonisation and coordination, infrastructure 
development. Further, investments in environmental management, and reforms in other 
vital public goods, such as governance, peace, defence and security, have been impressive.  
 
Most notably, the regional Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy, introduced in 2019, 
outlines the strategic interventions needed for the acceleration of agricultural sector 
development in the region that focused on improving food security; accelerating irrigation 
development; strengthening Early Warning Systems; strengthening research, extension and 
43 
 
training; increasing intra- and inter-regional trade and commerce and physical infrastructure 
and utilities, that all to make the EAC a revitalised and flourishing economic bloc in 2030. 
 
Globalisation 
By 2018, all EAC member countries had fully embraced the idea of globalisation. As 
agriculture became more specialised in the 2020s, owing to the removal of long-term 
barriers and disruptive mechanisms such as export subsidies by the EU, the US and other 
major economies, fewer people were engaged in commercial farming. Even in high potential 
farming areas the  expansion of existing farm operations often meant structural changes in 
agriculture, which displaced more labour than it generated. In marginal farming areas that 
were unable to compete in the global markets, the changes were more severe, and land 
transferred to other users or was abandoned by those unable to cope, with governments 
forced to take over the environmental rehabilitation of vast areas. 
 
Infrastructural development  
Infrastructural development was accelerated in the region by 2020 to facilitate fast flow of 
goods and services between borders based on the forces of demand and supply. Modern 
road and railway networks were built and existing ones upgraded or reconstructed by 
member states to connect major cities within the EAC region. Substantial investments were 
made in harbour and port infrastructure to facilitate trade. In 2018, the East Africa railway 
was re-established and upgraded to meet the challenges of modern transport. These 
infrastructural improvements hastened  globalisation processes and significantly improved 
people’s livelihoods through enhanced trade, capital flows and information technology. 
Based on the principles of comparative advantage, by 2020 the total outputs by trading 
partners had increased markedly.  The modernised infrastructure in the region attracted 
foreign direct investments through the expansion of multinational companies from the 
developed or rich countries hence boosting livelihoods in the EAC region by 2030. 
 
A revolution in information technology through the adoption of fibre optic cable technology 
led to a sharp reduction of communication costs by 30% in the EAC region by 2015. Many 
cross-border television broadcasting stations such as the EATV were established by 2013, 
contributing to expanded trade opportunities in the EAC region. The introduction of efficient 
information systems and the firm establishment of e-commerce by 2020 had spurred 
greater economic growth in the EAC region in 2030. However, although the young, educated 
city dwellers are finding work in call-centre type opportunities in the digital age, millions of 
people in the rural areas and urban slums have been all but left behind as the ‘digital divide’ 
has deepened in the region. 
 
In respect of energy provision, by 2020 the EAC had established a common grid for power 
supply in the region and all major towns and cities were on the grid. But the source was new 
generation coal-fired power stations and the electricity was expensive. By 2030, two 
regional renewable energy supplies (i.e. wind power and hydro-power) have been 
established and are feeding electricity onto the grid. The rising demand of bio-fuels led to 
the establishment of two pilot bio-fuel refineries (in Kenya and Ethiopia) and this had 
adverse influence on food security. The consumption of energy by the agricultural sector 
increased by 10% due to adoption of mechanization, increased use of fertilizers and 
establishment of agro-based industries.  
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Agricultural development 
Agricultural-led development has remained fundamental to reducing hunger and poverty, 
generating economic growth, reducing the burden of food imports and opening the way to 
expanding exports. In 2030, the far more efficient agricultural sector contributes over 50 per 
cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provides 60 per cent of all employment in 
East Africa. Some sixty per cent of the total population lives in rural areas and is dependent 
mainly on agriculture for its livelihood (this is down from 70-80% in 2010), although not all 
these people are producers anymore. The young and skilled population in rural areas migrates to 
urban areas in search of employment in the newly established industries meant that the old and less 
skilled population are left in villages managing agricultural production. The lower availability of 
labour leads to increased dependency on mechanization.  
 
With regard to livestock based livelihood systems, availability and carrying capacity of 
pastures has declined from 2010 to 2030 by between 10% and 25%. This has pushed the 
majority of pastoralists out of livestock production and into a more vulnerable existence in 
towns and cities. Nevertheless, with more efficient technology and a concentration of 
ownership in the sector, livestock trade and marketing has strengthened its position as the 
essential component of the agricultural production sector in the EAC region with exports to 
the Arabian peninsula and North Africa booming. A regional livestock market information 
system was developed and operationalised in 2018. In 2020, a regional livestock trade and 
marketing committee was formed to provide guidance on the matters of trade and 
marketing that saw returns from livestock sales increase by 20% year on year in the period 
2022-2027. To further support livestock development initiatives in the EAC region, an EAC 
Regional Steering Committee on Transboundary Animal Diseases was formed in 2020 that 
contributed to improved livestock health and productivity. 
 
Climate in the EAC has warmed by 1 degree centigrade by 2030 with a wide range of 
adverse impacts on both ecosystem survival and productivity. For example, the area 
covered by arid and semi-arid lands in the region increased from 70% of the land mass in 
2010 to 85% in 2030. This has put water and grazing resources under extreme pressure. 
Also, the area devoted to food crops and productivity of diversified crop agriculture in the 
EAC region increased by 2015 owing to the adoption of more competitive and commercially 
oriented technologies by the agricultural sector. Worryingly, the frequency of droughts in 
the region has increased to 1 in 5 years in 2010 to 1 in 4 years in 2030. Investments in 
intensive rain water capture and storage activities have reduced pressure on the available 
water resources for hi-tech, export agriculture. The improved regional capacity to control 
agricultural pests and livestock diseases is difficult to maintain: frequent outbreaks of 
(previously undetected) diseases that now require livestock to be destroyed cause localised 
social upheaval and engender opposition to the EAC and its policies. Pastoralist groups have 
been the biggest losers over the past 20 years and they still frequently clash with police and 
the military in many of the drier regions and the towns of the EAC. 
 
Agricultural productivity (food crops) gains have been registered in highland areas due to 
the warmer temperatures, but productivity losses were registered in the ASALs due to 
enhanced evapotranspiration. The duration (length of growing period) of most crops was 
reduced by 4 to 5 days in 2030, leading to loss of yield in the ASALs of the EAC region.  
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The marketing opportunities for agricultural produce (cereals, vegetables and fruits) 
increased by 30% in 2015 as more states acceded to the EAC treaty. Generally, the 
cultivated area in the region increased from the current 50 million hectares in 2010 to about 
65 million hectares in the 2030 due to expanded markets and better market prices. 
Consequently, more land was opened up and devoted to cereal and horticultural crops. This 
placed new pressures on environmental resources, particularly on soil, water and forest 
management systems. This was partly because peasant farmers have been forced to expand 
into less productive areas with poorer soils. Crop failure in this sector had become more 
common, despite the investments in agriculture research and extension. 
 
By 2015, most of the countries in the region had invested 10% of their national budgets in 
agriculture in line with the “Maputo declaration”. Farmers sought and adopted improved 
production technologies that were competitive and commercially oriented in an endeavour 
to meet the EAC regional market as well as global market demands. In 2020, the EAC 
formulated and implemented a policy that encouraged through subsidies the export of 
value added major cash crops such as coffee, tea, cashew, coconuts, and sugarcane. By 
2030, these initiatives have attracted higher market prices that generated impressive 
foreign exchange earnings that have increased the purchasing power of the commercial 
farmers in the EAC region. The processing of agricultural commodities has created more 
employment opportunities for the people, so that many have come to enjoy better food 
and livelihood security. Of course, these gains depend heavily on the stability and increase 
in demand in global markets which, given the totally integrated nature of the global 
economy and the worldwide political pressures to institute ‘free trade’ everywhere, remain 
unpredictable. Periodic collapses in specific markets to date have been offset by overall 
gains, but farmers in the affected sectors have suffered losses. A too narrow focus on maize 
production led in 2014 to a situation where a failure of the maize crop and a shortage of 
white maize spelled hunger for the population and caused tremendous social upheaval 
across the region.  
 
Agricultural investments in the EAC region increased by 15% to 2015 and have increased, 
albeit at lower rates, year on year thereafter. These investments have gone into 
technological inputs, increased access to affordable credit and to markets, investments in 
irrigated agriculture, the establishment of value addition industries and the strengthening of 
regional agreements for extension, research and innovation, credit, agro-processing and 
marketing.  
 
The devastating drought that occurred between 2020 and 2022 had far reaching impacts on 
the regional economy and food security. The established regional grain reserves in 2018 
with assistance from the WFP and the FAO enabled the region to effectively manage the 
difficult situations in the first and second years. During the third year the region was highly 
dependent on external supports/food aids and imports from the global market. The 
member countries were able to avoid severe malnutrition and deaths. This strained the 
economy of the countries in the region leading to a near zero growth in GDPs. Subsequently, 
more regional grain reserves (of esp. cereals such as maize and wheat) were established in 
2023 to offer protection against future droughts of longer duration more than 3 years. High 
levels of support from the Global Climate Change Fund for carbon-neutral ‘conservation 
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agriculture’ development has seen agricultural productivity increase by 10% every year in 
the decade to 2030. But to date the main benefits from this increase in productivity are 
enjoyed by farmers and consumers in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and the DRC. 
 
By 2024, increased returns to farming had caused the cost of agricultural land in high 
potential areas to escalate. This locked the majority of peasant farmers out of expanding 
markets and encouraged specialisation in cash crop and livestock production that met the 
standards of the globalised market. The peasant farmers in the high potential areas and 
ASALs had no choice but to take poorly paid, often seasonal labour on the specialised farms. 
However, increased taxes from the vibrant business sector resulted in more state 
investment and generally improved the quality of life of the majority of people of the EAC 
region. Rural poverty started declining in 2020, but mostly because of a steady migration of 
people to the cities and towns.  
 
Natural resource management 
Attention was paid proactively to sustainable management strategies of natural resources 
by 2018, because these were seen as critical for propelling economic development and 
livelihoods. The EAC oversaw protracted negotiations to harmonise policies regarding 
common natural resource policies addressing forestry, energy, water and mining. Regional 
initiatives to increase the area of land under forest, to promote soil and water conservation 
and to control of striga weed and transboundary human and livestock diseases were all in 
motion by 2018. The EAC had afforested 15% of the previously forested areas in 2025, 
resulting in substantial transfers from global mitigation funds.  
 
With regard to shared water resources in the EAC region, the management of Lake Victoria 
and its environs was established on a firm footing by 2015 and by 2025, the Nile Basin 
Management Agreement was implemented. Member countries of the EAC continued to 
abstract water from big lakes in the region and expanded the acreage under irrigated 
agriculture by 30% in the 20 years to 2030. This resulted in more production of cash crops 
for export and improved livelihoods for farmers, but negatively affected fisherfolk. In 
addition, by 2024, the sustainable management of the East African coastline had become a 
focus of donor attention, in an attempt to secure the future of fishing for coastal areas as 
both income and food security options. The instability along the Somalian coastline and 
ongoing disputes with Mozambican and Asian superpower fishing companies resulted in a 
hostile environment for law enforcement agents, so that the marine fish resources of EAC 
were severely plundered. 
 
Food security 
National food security strategies in the development plans of EAC member countries have 
enjoyed a high priority since about 2015, but this has not always translated into radical 
changes on the ground. Biosafety and food safety standards in the EAC have improved with 
effective measures being put in place to curb the incidence of aflatoxins in grains and cases 
of unsafe meat and meat products. In addition, more social safety nets were introduced to 
cushion especially the poor against the adverse impacts of climate change in relation to 
food security, but these proved to be very costly and subject to rent-seeking by local 
officials. Nevertheless, it is clear that these measures have saved many vulnerable rural 
people from destitution. 
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Livelihoods 
Although uneven, EA has made significant improvements in livelihoods due to increased 
investment in the economy, production, improved infrastructure and market availability. 
The opening of more industries, farms, and infrastructure improvements has increased 
employment opportunities in urban areas and therefore the level of income has increased. 
However, the governments in the region still do not pay sufficient attention to social 
services e.g. minimum wage, social security, health services etc. The lack of political 
attention to the needs of the poor has created wide gaps between services available to the 
poor and the rich.  There is inequality in the distribution of the wealth in the region. 
Although the income levels have gone up by 10%, the cost of living has also gone up by 20% 
and the increase in income for the poor does not match the escalating cost of living. 
 
The availability of employment opportunities in different places has resulted in migrations 
with more people on the move, looking for employment opportunities and resources.  This 
coupled with the difference in economic status has broken down the social ties and reduced 
the social cohesion of communities and groups.  
 
The commercial farmers have invested in health facilities for their employees and generally 
speaking rural people are able to access these facilities.  There is improved access to private 
health care for some due to investments in the health service provision by the private 
sector.  However, the urban poor cannot afford private health care and the state-managed 
hospitals are understaffed and poorly equipped.  The commercial farms invest in knowledge 
and skills for their employees.  Generally speaking, East Africa will have improved 
knowledge and skills for the whole food system, with better integration into the global 
economy, but many urban consumers are spectators. 
 
 
  
48 
 
Scenario 2:  Regional Integration and Reactive: Narrative 
 
EA region in the Context of the Global situation  
 
Currently global trends are largely focused on country groupings to address economic, 
political and social challenges and opportunities. Grouping such as European Union (EU), G7 
Nations and NATO have emerged over the years. Similarly East Africa with it’s overflowing 
potential - from agriculture to minerals to tourism to energy sees itself making great strides 
as a bloc.  It had a huge combined population of more than 160 million and a young, skilled 
and enterprising labour force. What was required was a means for the EAC countries to 
cooperate in harnessing their potential to cause economic growth and development. EA 
integration was driven by the need to establish an export-oriented economy for its member 
states in which there would be a common market with free movement of goods, persons, 
labour, services, capital, information and technology; the need to acquire international 
market access and have strong bargaining power in negotiating trade agreements as one 
bloc; the need to cooperate in investment and industrialisation - expansion of manufacture 
and export of industrial and agro-processed goods from EA states. This would transform the 
economy and foster overall socio-economic development in the member states.  
 
Integration of East Africa 
The year is 2030. The East African federation has been operational for nearly 8 years. It has 
a revolving presidency; a regional judiciary and legislative body that resolve integration 
related conflicts within the region; it also has a joint regional peace keeping force. The 
Federation, also known as the East African Community (EAC), comprises 8 countries. The 
countries are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia and DR 
Congo.  The Integration of the EAC bloc began to take effect in 2010, starting with 5 
countries - Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The 3 other countries, having 
followed the positive developments taking place, applied to join the community. Southern 
Sudan joined in 2013, Ethiopia in 2017, and finally DR Congo in late 2022. 
 
The EAC formed a free trade area and a customs union in 2010, thus removing trade barriers 
within the community. The common market, which allowed for the free movement of 
businesses, people, goods and capital across borders, became fully functional in 2012. The 
bloc moved to a common currency, the East African pound, in 2015. But reaping the 
benefits of the federation took longer than earlier anticipated. This is because the member 
states had issues to sort out particularly regarding democracy/political instability and 
internal security problems.  As the challenges to joining the Community were being sorted 
out, the EAC was making progress in the harmonisation of laws, trade policy, regulations, 
procedures and standards, financial and investment policies, tariffs and agreement on 
sharing resources.  
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Infrastructural Development 
The countries have developed the regional infrastructure facilities - railways, roads, air 
transport, inland and coastal waterways, and telecommunications. In 2030, there is an 
efficient EA railway network that links 2 main lines- one that connects Mombasa (Kenya) to 
Kasese (Uganda) and the line that connects Rwanda and Burundi to the Tanzanian railway 
system. The Kenya-Uganda railway line was revamped in 2012. The respective countries 
then built extensions to other parts of their countries. The new railway line connecting 
Rwanda and Burundi to the Tanzanian railway system was completed in 2016. In 2012, work 
to link the 2 railway routes began and this was completed in 2022.   
 
ICT infrastructure is highly developed in 2030. The 3 undersea fiber optic cables that were 
separately laid out to connect East Africa to high-speed internet - Seacom, Teams and Eassy 
that reached the east are now interlinked. The interlinking of all cables was finalised in 
2015.  The EAC no longer suffers from intermittent internet downtime.  Also between 2010 
and 2017, the respective EAC countries laid out their national networks of fibre optic cable. 
By 2018, there was 80% connectivity in all the cities and major towns in the EAC region and 
e-commerce picked up exponentially. By 2020, 35% of trade in the region was electronic and 
by 2030 the 70% of business, management and administrative transactions in the region 
was done online.  
 
In 2030, many local companies are regional, that is, they have branches in the different EAC 
states. On average, 50% of business enterprises in the EAC are regional. The EAC economy is 
booming. The level of industrialisation has grown by 50% from the previously low levels in 
2010. There is a thriving private sector driven by domestic and foreign direct investments in 
the region. There is, for instance, thriving business in the minerals, forestry and tourism 
sectors.  
 
Agricultural Development 
There has been a 120% increase in the production of cash crops, bio-fuels and livestock for 
export, but much of this output is increasingly directed to the agro-based industries within 
the region. As much as 60% of the food imported by the Arab world is from the EAC. 
Because of the employment opportunities now available, the purchasing power of the EA 
population is up – 60% of the population are above the poverty line. However, the 
population of city dwellers in the EAC has also risen to 80% of the national population. Also, 
the EA governments have not been paying attention to urban planning, so the cities are 
sprawling with slums with poor sanitation conditions.  
 
In 2030 however, while EA integration is performing very well with regard to economic, 
trade and political issues, it is being reactive on implementation of policies relating to food 
security, climate change and environmental management. The EA integration does not pay 
attention to the EAC treaty terms related to environment and environmental management, 
livelihoods and poverty and food security. It is international NGOs and civil society 
organisations that are proactive on aspects of environmental management and food 
security within the region, but they still work independently. As a result, their actions have 
no significant impact over a wider area within EA. Also, with the investments in agriculture 
focused on the export market, limited attention is paid to environmental management. This 
focus does not prepare East Africa for environment-related shocks in the market.  In effect, 
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the trade systems lack the resilience to withstand surprises that emanate from 
environmental variability. The responsible institutions do not have the capacity to assess or 
respond to the uncertainty of the export/import environment in light of the changing 
climate. 
 
In the light of changing climate the region faced devastating drought which lasted between 
2020-2022 and affected productivity to minimum. In this situation the government reverted 
to food reserve as a short term solution to combat the problem, followed by importation of 
food and giving aid to severely affected regions. In the medium term solution the 
government shifted severely affected communities to unaffected areas as well as 
emphasized on food production within the regions which were not badly hit. Livestock 
keepers were also adviced to reduce their stock by selling their livestock for them to be able 
to purchase food products rather than lose the livestock due to water and feed stress. 
 
 Futhermore, East African integration is frequently affected by changes in the world market, 
making its economy susceptible to crisis whenever there is any change in the world market.  
 
Environmental/Natural Resource Management 
The East African region’s economic and livelihood fabric is highly dependent on its natural 
resource endowment which includes water, land, soils of different types, forests and 
biodiversity. Although sustainable environmental conservation and management are 
recognised in all major development plans and other national strategies across the region, 
action and implementation remains below expectation. Recognising the role of 
environmental resources in the East Africa in political stability, economic growth and 
general security, the East African Community in 2010 formulated a comprehensive Regional 
Natural Resource Management Strategy. The Strategy spelt out key intervention areas 
which included watershed management, water management, and protection and 
rehabilitation of fragile lands. In addition, in 2018, the emerging Community formally 
recognised the need to mainstream climate variability and climate change in all 
development activities. At the national level, countries continue to formulate specific 
policies and strategies to address what appeared to be seriously degrading ecosystems. 
Despite evident efforts by the various governments in the region to formulate strategies, 
policies and even legislation to address environmental degradation, there was no attention 
to building the capacity of responsible institutions to implement the required actions. These 
policies and strategies thus remain on paper. The work of the relevant institutions revolve 
around reactive interventions and thus popularising disaster response plans at the expense 
of clearly thought-out preparations based on region-wide, integrated early warning systems.  
 
Availability of adequate water is a major determinant of agricultural productivity in the 
region. In 2030, water is a major constraint to attaining food security. Although existing 
legislative frameworks are strong, because of poor implementation of these laws, the region 
has witnessed considerable decline of water quantity and water quality. In 2020, it became 
evident that the water level of most lakes in the region, including Lakes Victoria, Baringo, 
Nakuru, Tanganyika, Edward, Albert and Naivasha was steadily declining. In effect, between 
2010 and 2020, water levels in Lake Victoria declined by approximately 2.5 meters while 
50% of Lake Nakuru remained dry over a period of 8 months per year in moderately dry 
years. Water pollution from both point and non-point sources showed an increase over the 
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period 2010 and 2025. Eutrophication levels in Lake Victoria as well as suspended matter 
recorded a significant increase. Water pollution due to poor sanitation facilities, 
misapplication of fertilisers, and destruction of watersheds continue to be a major concern 
on water resources management and this could stare conflicts among the countries which 
shares the water. Other sources of water pollution include improper disposal of industrial 
waste as well agro-chemicals and inadequate domestic sanitation systems. This is evidenced 
by the massive death of fish in Lake Naivasha in Kenya in 2010 and again in 2018. It is 
estimated that the level of water pollution across the region has increased by about 30% 
with about 60% of the remaining ecosystems being under threat despite increasing 
government allocation to develop and manage water resources. The governments will then 
tender to put emphasis n solving the emerging conflicts around the water rather than 
addressing long term solution to the circumstances undermining the water resources.  
 
Depleted and fragile soils have over the years come to characterise the region. This is taking 
place under the watch of governments and line ministries. All the regional plans list 
milestones for achieving enhanced soil fertility through sustainable farming, but these have 
not been adequately resourced or rolled out. Improper management of agro-chemicals and 
unregulated cultivation of crops has lead to soil contamination and degradation. 
Deforestation and land clearing is widely practiced as the need for land has increased with 
every passing year. The opening up of new land for agriculture has exacerbated soil erosion 
and soil degradation. Monoculture, mechanisation, improper management of agro-
chemicals and reduction in fallow periods have reduced the quality of soils. The emerging 
voice from the civil society and environmental NGOs during the period 2015 – 2020 forced 
governments in the region to enact specific laws to enhance soil fertility.  However, these 
are still not well implemented. 
 
Although there has been improvements in the use of renewable energies, the cost of energy 
is still high due to increase in demand and 60% of the population are still be dependant on 
fuelwood. This translates into a still increasing rate of deforestation, even though the 
impacts of deforestation on climate are now well understood. 
 
Over the years, there has been limited attention to conservation of biodiversity by the 
governments. Expansion of agricultural land, mechanisation, the use of GMOs and 
destruction of catchment areas has led to loss of biodiversity.  Although indigenous plant 
species have become a valuable source of remedies for health disorders for the population, 
there is indiscriminate harvest due to costly health services. Conservation measures are 
highly dependent on the work of international NGOs.  However, the scarcity of financial 
resources will limit the focus to key biodiversity hotspots. 
 
Environmental action is very limited and mainly in form of response to crises such as 
competition over strategic water resources with potential to cause civil strife. There is 
watershed destruction throughout the region. The poor planning for water management 
coupled with the unpredictability of the rains will reduce water available for industry, 
agriculture, livestock, fisheries. 
 
Food Security 
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In 2030, many agribusiness industries are established and the region is exporting most of its 
agric outputs and processed foods. This has been the result of improved and interconnected 
infrastructure with better roads, rail networks, energy, telecommunications, food storage 
facilities, ports, air transport, water and coastal inland navigation. Similarly, heavy 
investment in mechanisation, application of agro-chemicals, genetically modified (GM) 
crops, commercial farming and agribusiness between 2015 and 2020, encouraged a small 
group of farmers to produce more, and increased land for agriculture.   
 
The region has become a major food exporter. However, land degradation and other 
environmental factors such as unreliable rains have affected agricultural activities and thus 
food security of the small scale landholder farmers. They produce too much food during the 
good rains and nothing during the dry spells. These are poorly resourced small-holder 
farmers who still do not have good storage facilities and are forced to sell all of their 
products to avoid spoilage.   
 
The high value foods are meant for the rich and the export market.  The high value 
indigenous crops such as local vegetables are grown for a niche market and are thus 
expensive.  Even though there improved food security in the region compared to 20 years 
ago, local food prices are high and because of inequity in distribution of wealth in the 
region, the poor are still food insecure. Although there are regional phyto-sanitary and food 
safety standards, these are only being applied to the export products. Furthermore, there is 
limited attention paid to the nutritional value of food crops meant for the local market. 
 
Forty percent of the population (comprising the rural poor & unskilled labourers in the 
urban areas) is still poor and unable to afford locally produced food. Some national 
governments – responding to EAC directives - have established food reserves, but the 
farmers prefer to sell their produce to the open market where they are offered better 
prices. The high food prices coupled with the lack of government support, has led to the 
reserves being inadequately stocked. National governments and the EAC are mainly 
involved in crisis management in times of disaster. The governments have been forced to 
import cheaper food of inferior quality, which is affordable to the poor, but in the process, 
sacrificing hard-earned foreign exchange.   
 
By 2019, improper management of agrochemicals and unregulated cultivation of GMO crops 
has led to soil contamination and soil degradation, resulting into poor yield and loss of 
capital to most of the investors and small scale farmers. This culminated in declined food 
security in most agro-ecological zones in the region. By 2025, a small percentage of small-
holder farmers in each member country have been empowered through training offered by 
NGOs and research and extension centres in ‘conservation agriculture’, i.e. the proper use of 
agrochemicals and GMOs and in the five years to 2030, this has led to higher levels of 
sustainable production. There is increased access to financial services for the commercial 
farmer but a reduction is small scale financial systems available to small farmers and 
cooperatives and here too, NGOs are forced to step in and make up the shortfall. 
 
Livelihoods 
Although uneven, EA has made significant improvements in livelihoods due to increased 
investment in the economy, production, improved infrastructure and market availability. 
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The opening of more industries, farms, and infrastructure improvements has increased 
employment opportunities in urban areas and therefore the level of income has increased. 
However, the governments in the region still do not pay sufficient attention to social 
services e.g. minimum wage, social security, health services etc. The lack of political 
attention to the needs of the poor has created wide gaps between services available to the 
poor and the rich.  There is inequality in the distribution of the wealth in the region. 
Although the income levels have gone up by 10%, the cost of living has also gone up by 20% 
and the increase in income for the poor does not match the escalating cost of living. 
 
The availability of employment opportunities in different places has resulted in migrations 
with more people on the move, looking for employment opportunities and resources.  This 
coupled with the difference in economic status has broken down the social ties and reduced 
the social cohesion of communities and groups.  
 
The commercial farmers have invested in health facilities for their employees and generally 
speaking rural people are able to access these facilities.  There is improved access to private 
health care for some due to investments in the health service provision by the private 
sector.  However, the urban poor cannot afford private health care and the state-managed 
hospitals are understaffed and poorly equipped.  
 
The commercial farms invest in knowledge and skills for their employees.  Generally 
speaking, East Africa will have improved knowledge and skills for the whole food system, 
with better integration into the global economy, but many urban consumers are spectators.   
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Scenario 3: Status quo and Proactive: Narrative 
 
Introduction 
East African countries depend on agriculture. However, this sector is largely rainfed 
dependent and hence frquently suffers the impacts of climate variability. Thus agricultural 
production in the region doesnot provide enough food for the growing population. Thus 
food insecurity is felt by larger majority especially the rural poor. Recent climate change has 
emerged as an added challenge. 
 
Global situation  
Like other developing regions, the East Africa region is under very strong global and regional 
pressure from the forces of globalisation, the economic dominance of the Asian superpower 
states, and from crises brought on by climate change. Other challenges that states in the 
region still grapple with are population pressure, resource degradation, national and 
regional conflicts, rocketing fuel prices and fluctuating markets. These challenges 
agricultural production and productivity, and vast majority of the population are food 
insecure. Hence, the livelihoods of the people are at risk. 
 
Politically and economically, the EA region is in a difficult position: on the one hand, there is 
a drive to strengthen the regional economy and collective action of EA countries through 
the well established mechanisms of the East African Community (EAC). On the other hand, 
countries seek to maintain the status quo (national sovereignty) in key areas of policy, such 
as natural resource use and management and the forging of bilateral linkages with now 
‘emerged’ powers like India and China and the waning economic blocs in the West. On the 
whole, in 2010 there is a predominance of national self-interest in relation to economic, 
political and military agendas, over regional cooperation and the collective benefits that 
such cooperation could deliver. 
 
Integration (Governance and markets in the EAC region = Economic) 
There is proactive efforts towards integration made during the past 5 years in 2015. Starting 
in 2016, the East African Community (EAC) worked hard to proactively increase cooperation 
in socio-political and economic issues, mainly within and between the five original EAC 
member countries. This brought significant economic benefits and foreign investment. As 
this cooperation strengthened and benefits thereof began to emerge in 2020, Ethiopia, with 
their large populations and growing economies moved to join the EAC by 2024.  Although 
the cooperation opened up access to significantly larger markets and to vastly more natural 
resources like minerals and water that drive economic growth in the region, the reality in 
2030 is that the rigidity of individual countries, bilateral agreements with Asian superpower 
states and foreign companies, and the power struggles among member governments for 
control of the EAC, regional and national economic and social progress was still not as high 
as anticipated in 2020. The reality is that political divisions undermined the collective 
implementation of effective regional policies and weakened the negotiation power of the 
region on the global stage. Although the prevailing situation by 2030 allows economic 
development in the region. However, there is  continued instability, poor governance, 
corruption and some degree of poverty within and among the member states. As a result, 
conflicts in some countries within the region remain unresolved without ‘outside’ help. The 
competitive interests of individual states that prevailed at the expense of others and of the 
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region as a whole allowed external actors to manipulate governments and play the 
countries in the region off against each other when it comes to critical investments and 
policy decisions. 
 
Infrastructural development 
By 2030, there is stronger cooperation and linkages among member countries in certain 
sectors, where despite national foot-dragging for regional cooperation, proactive policy 
makers working with Asian superpower countries and companies, have made substantial 
progress. This is particularly noticeable in respect of regional infrastructure development: 
regional road and railway networks that have been totally revamped so that these systems 
are recognisable from those of 2010. The regional power grid have been overhauled and 
ports and harbours in the region have also enjoyed huge investments. However, many of 
these developments serve the interests of the Asian powers themselves who need efficient 
transport networks and systems to be able to repatriate agricultural produce and mineral 
resources to India, China, South Korea and Japan. 
 
In the decade since 2020, excellent progress has also been made by the EAC in managing the 
region’s water resources more sustainably for the benefit of all member countries. Again, 
foreign investors have been key here: new water-saving technologies have been introduced 
in areas of high agricultural potential and most cities in the region are supplied with world-
class water supply and reticulation systems. The numbers of highly efficient hydro-electricity 
schemes, developed through investments by the Global Climate Change Adaptation and 
Mitigation Fund, have proliferated in the region, powering economic development and 
enhancing environmental sustainability. But, these benefits are not shared by all – on the 
whole, rural people are still water-insecure and in 2030, actually have less access to potable 
water than 20 years before. Also, some of the smaller countries have suffered in relation to 
water access: economically dominant, downstream countries dominate the use of the 
region’s water resources, undermining the stated commitment to the principles of equitable 
sharing and efficient utilisation. Because potable water is supplied to cities at cost, it is the 
poor and rural dwellers who are water insecure. This is reflected in the reduction of water 
access per capita by 20% in 2030, reaching crisis proportions in the countries were the 
governments are weak and/or corrupt. This gives rise to social conflict and unrest which 
threatens regional cohesion. 
 
Investments by Asian powers/Globalisation 
In 2020, the EAC signed and started to implement a regional economic and market 
cooperation network, where amongst others there are no tariffs in market transactions 
amongst the countries. However, implementation remains challenging as member states 
continue to act in their own best interests. This meant that the Asian powers continued to 
take advantage of the discord in the region to further exploit the public goods like mineral 
resources, land and cheap labour.  
 
In 2030, regional markets still do not operate as well as they could, because of the 
disconnect in policies and market linkages. The Asian powers are able to draw off the key 
resources to benefit their own economies. Less competitive countries in the region 
experience foreign currency depletion as the price of economic co-operation with the Asian 
powers. This is because the many infrastructural and economic investments are on the basis 
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of loans not grants. Investment by local populations in the region is down due to increased 
poverty. The Asian powers influence government leaders at the expense of the public, in 
some cases through corrupt practices, including bribery. With trade tariffs removed in the 
EAC, local consumers exchange more or less the same goods with little profit. Even though 
they emphasise food security, many countries continue to experience food shortages, 
especially in the areas far from the new transport infrastructure. 
 
It is noticeable, however, that the ‘Asian Tigers’ have had positive impacts through increases 
in human capital, and through investment in physical capital, which has risen sharply in the 
decade to 2030. After 2020, there has been considerable migration to urban areas, so that 
by 2030, some 60% of the people in the region are resident in cities and bigger towns. 
Despite the rise in human capital, the increase in human capital migration to cities and also 
out of the region by 2030, has resulted in low-to-medium technological advances in sectors 
that are not core interests of foreign investors.  
 
Environmental/Natural resource management 
Development partners of EA region fail to increase their financial assistance for investment 
in water resources. At a local level, civil society groups that are working closely with 
communities strengthen and enhance their investment in the water sector. These groups 
build and strengthen the capacities of communities in conflict prevention and resolution, by 
building on local conflict resolution mechanisms and strengthening the culture of dialogue.  
 
EA Governments are the key institutions in the region. They carry the ultimate responsibility 
to provide sustainable livelihoods for their citizens and address issues related to war, 
internal strife, and resource management and use. However, the region’s governments will 
not coordinate their efforts to preserve and protect the environment, and ensure the 
sustainable use of resources. They will continue to bypass the need to harmonise national 
strategies and policies, for example by strengthening meteorological and hydrological 
services and monitoring networks. Furthermore, they will continue to countout the need to 
make access to water a human right and fail to establish legislation for minimum service 
levels. They will not draw up sound national strategies for NR management and fail to agree 
on transboundary water resources discussions for shared basins, for example the Juba-
Shebelle and Omo-Turkana basins, and hence will not be able to finalise the Nile 
cooperative framework.  
EA regional problem of water is further aggravated by a number of emerging threats. These 
include climate change, as well as an increasing population and the subsequent increase in 
demands for environmental resources especially water. There is severe water scarcity or 
water stress. Climate change has the potential to impose severe pressures on water 
availability and accessibility. 
 
Food security is directly linked to environmental resources such as water availability and 
accessibility. This plagued the desire to improve agricultural productivity and attain regional 
food security is. With climate change, increasing water scarcity increases the potential for 
conflict within and between EA countries. The Darfur dispute in western Sudan stems in part 
from competition over water, mainly between different resource users; nomads and 
farmers share water and land in the region, but these are both getting meagre due to 
climate variability and expanding desertification.  
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The increasing severity and scale of impacts on environmental resources resulting from 
climate change is lead to severe socio-economic and environmental impacts and require 
costly adaptation effortsbwhich many of EA countries will not be able to manage. 
 
Under the statusquo, current environmental management practices in EAfrica are unlikely 
to be adequate to cope with the projected negative impacts of climate change for example 
on water availability and distribution. EAfrica needs a much greater focus on increasing 
people’s adaptive capacity to climate variability and climate change over the long term. 
Although key to improving future adaptation efforts is the incorporation of current climate 
variability into development planning and management, EA countries do not have clear 
adaptation response strategies.  
 
In 2010, countries in EA (e.g. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) 
were under severe water stress. Water scarcity leads to conflict. In February 2009, tens of 
thousands of people were reported to have fled their homes as a result of fighting between 
rival groups in southern Ethiopia. Reports suggest 300 people may have been killed and 
more than 100,000 displaced. Armed conflicts, particularly over water, are not unusual in 
southern Ethiopia. They have been increasing in recent years because drought has made 
control over wells and water points even more critical. This has constrained food 
production, ecosystem maintenance and economic development by 2030. 
 
However, countries in EA region have a very low capacity to address current and impending 
water scarcity and environmental insecurity: They are most affected by political instability, 
governance problems, activities of liberation movements, post-election disturbances and 
wars between and within countries in countries of EA region.  
 
Negotitiations on transboundary water cooperation among EAC are lengthy, except in 
Ethiopia, there are no visible efforts to develop long term water resources development 
plans for the region. Although National and regional organsations continue to poorly assess 
the sustainability of their environmental resources, they will not be getting out of the 
routine annual planning exercise and engaging in long term assessment of the 
environmental security of their citizens and the wellbeing of their environment.  
 
However, strongly encouraged by foreign donors and international NGOs, and with 
resources made available from the Global Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Fund, 
the EAC proactively recognised early on both the urgency and the benefits of dealing land 
degradation, drought and flood effects and other impacts of climate change regionally. In 
2015, the region developed an comprehensive EAC Climate Change Policy (EACCP), which 
addressed specific issues that challenge the region such as water resources, agriculture, 
energy, transport, health, forestry, wildlife, land and infrastructure. The EACCCP was 
consistent with the provisions of the East African Treaty, the EAC Protocol on Environment 
and Natural Resources, the Protocol on Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin as 
well as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, 
because of political horse-trading, the first implementation of these policies did not take 
place until 2018, while the management of all cross-boundary resources except water 
remained a challenge into the 2020s.  
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In the decade 2010-2019, governments made their own policies that work nationally, but 
there was disagreement with other countries regarding the most appropriate regional 
policies. These sectoral policies within the respective countries effectively undermined 
development of the region and weakened institutional arrangements and collective 
decision. By 2020, however, EAC members, prompted by the commercial interests of foreign 
investors, realised that this mode of operating prevented them from making progress and 
began to adjust selected policies for the regional cooperation in resource use and 
management. In contrast, in areas where policy changes were not realised, civil society 
organisations identified problems and self-organised as pressure/ management groups 
around public goods that they regarded as important. These included flagship regional 
resources such as the Nile, Lake Victoria, Mabera Forest, Mao Forest and the Green Belt 
Movement. This helped to slow down the decline in forest cover per year In the period 
2023-2030, but the lack of joined up regional-level policy-making and institutional 
integration has undermined progress and continues to test the patience of donors and 
international partners. This is also reflected in poor forests governance and a poor record on 
managing the movement of pastoralists across national borders. In 2030, the capacity of 
institutions of individual states and the region to respond to emerging environmental 
challenges remains weak.   
 
In this scenario, there is a proliferation of NGOS and growth of civil society, so that these 
groupings take on the roles normally played by the public sector and global institutions. 
They are active in fields of development as broad as food aid, soil conservation, 
afforestation, conflict resolution, disarmament. In the period 2020 to 2030, the number of 
NGOs – many working regionally - increases by 40%, but they struggle to work cooperatively 
and are thus not very effective in holding the EAC and respective governments to account. 
In 2030, there is still inefficient use of resources and skills in the region and most of the civil 
society organisations and NGOs continue to rely on external support and expertise. 
 
Although the EAC does not make progress on regionalisation, there are others that have an 
impact on the region, such as the (Asian) Asian powers, the EU and Brazil. Their economic 
needs in relation to the resources in EAC member countries actually hampers further 
regional integration. 
 
 
 
Agricultural production/development 
In 2010, the EAC’s region agricultural productionwas a key sector in the economies of the 
member states. Estimates showed that 70 to 80 percent of the labour force in EAC was 
involved in this sector. These numbers changed progressively to 2030. By 2020, the number 
of people active in the food production in the region had decreased to 65 percent and by 
2030, it stood at 60%, although with regional fluctuations on a country-by-country basis. In 
2010, between 24 and 48 percent of the GDP in member countries, was attributed to the 
agriculture sector. By 2025, there was a proliferation of bilateral agreements on critical 
issues like cattle branding and disease and weed control without delivering the benefits of 
full integration of policies, so that issues still did not get tackled properly at regional level. In 
2030, agriculture made up 40% of the GDP of the region, but this proportion was more 
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variable and depended on shocks, such as devastating droughts and floods. Factors that 
contributed to low and unstable agricultural production are like hi-tech cash-cropping for 
export markets by private sector players and production and productivity occasioned by 
over-reliance on rainfall in low-input farming areas in the EAC widespread consecutive 
occurrences devastating droughts and frequent crop failure. The situation is compounded 
by poor or no access to affordable agricultural credit by resource poor producers, low 
producer prices making agriculture less remunerative and relatively high inflation rates, a 
situation which accelerate high degree of food insecurity and malnourishment, especially 
among the rural poor in the region. 
 
Agricultural production is divided into commercial, hi-tech cash cropping and concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs) for export, and low-input cropping and livestock farming 
at the margins for local consumption. This subsistence production is augmented by 
temporary employment in construction and maintenance sectors. 
 
Contract farming for horticultural crops like flowers, sugarcane, pineapple and citrus 
farming has boomed, but this benefits a small number of selected farmers. Staple crops like 
maize continue to be purchased soon after harvest when prices are low by businessmen 
who hold the stock in store and sell back to farmers at high price during lean periods. 
Additionally, businessmen sell staples across the borders with significant profit margins that 
add nothing to farmers’ incomes. 
 
Furthermore, regional market access (and access to global markets) falls into the hands of a 
few large players at the expense of farmers, most of small-holder farmers. Farmers are 
faced with reduced income due to high transaction costs in the value chains benefiting 
middlemen and large market players. 
 
 
Food Security 
The year 2010 marked the establishment of the EAC Food Security Action Plan (FSAP) which 
aimed at achieving sustainable food security and rational agricultural production. It was 
envisaged that the FSAP would guide coordination and implementation of the joint 
programmes and projects emanating from this plan under the EAC cooperation. In 2030, the 
majority of EAC member countries still failed to achieve individual and collective food 
security status. Due to the inability or refusal of member countries to implement the Food 
Security Action Plan, the scenario for food security in the region is uncertain and little 
sustainable food security in the region is expected.  
 
In 2030, even though there is the firm intention on paper (the policy is there, the funds are 
not) of establishing the EAC Strategic Grain Reserve, this opportunity is unrealised. Instead, 
several bigger countries have established their own food banks rather than wait for 
bureaucrats and politicians to create a regional food bank. Commodity-based private sector 
actors in the region self-organise to take advantage of market opportunities, but because of 
fragmentation/ competition they cannot gain good market access across the region. 
 
Livelihoods 
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Whereas the EAC economy in 2030 looks very encouraging with annual growth averaging 
8% over the past seven years, progress has been much slower in relation to poverty 
reduction and social advancement. The gap between the ruling classes and the general 
populations of countries in the region – as well as the gap between rural and urban has 
widened significantly. There are many millions of urban poor people in the region who are 
locked out of the benefits of economic growth. The wealthy have access to sufficient and 
high quality food, and luxurious motorcars to drive on the new highways and can afford to 
pay for electricity and clean tap water, but lives of the majority are still a daily struggle for 
survival: relying on fuelwood for their energy needs and exposed to the vagaries of climate 
variability. Fuel wood supplies are geopardised by deforestation, and fuel prices have 
escalated and thus dependence on remaining forest resources continued leading to further 
degradation. Education and welfare has stagnated, except where it is in the interests of the 
private sector to deliver these to their employees and their customers. There is huge list of 
food assisted people in both urban and rural areas. 
 
Grain traders in some parts of EAC take advantage of the food shortfalls and would have 
benefited. By 2030, massive public riots in most of the countries EA and widespread civil 
unrest broke out that led to overthrow of leaders. Some active opposition’s tookover 
governments and started putting up new democratic governances. 
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Scenario 4: Status Quo and Reactive: Narrative 
 
Governance and Political Stability 
In terms of governance, East Africa in 2030 is a world where agriculture remains the 
mainstay of the region’s economy, yet governments spend more on other sectors of the 
economy (e.g. national security) relative to agriculture. The share of agriculture in 
governments’ total expenditure seldom surpasses 10%. This is contrary to the pledges made 
at the meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, by the African Union’s heads of state and 
government in July 2003 to invest at least ten per cent of their national budgets in 
agriculture and increase productivity by at least six per cent. The low public expenditure on 
agriculture is a grave concern given the inadequacy of rural infrastructure (power, roads and 
water supply), technology and the need to develop efficient input and output markets, and 
functional extension services. Ethiopia, however has kept this promise, while Kenya still 
spends less than five per cent. This failure to implement both regional and international 
agreements has been a common feature in the region between in the 20 years to 2030. 
 
Corruption is a major impediment to effective governance, especially the delivery of 
government services in the region. However, every newly-elected government is anxious to 
develop firm regulatory frameworks to combat the menace that is still stalks the higher 
echelons of public administration and politics in their countries. The effort is demonstrated 
by having national organisations mandated to regulate, prevent and investigate corruption, 
like the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Bureau of the United Republic of Tanzania. The organisations are members of the East 
African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA). 
 
Corruption has moved from bad to worse in the region in 2030. This has forced the 
respective governments to continuously spend colossal amounts of public funds in self 
defence mechanisms like setting up of one commission of enquiry after another at the 
expense of economic development. Where corruption remains uncontrolled, a few rich, 
powerful and politically-correct individuals (the so-called big fish) plunder the scarce public 
resources meant for infrastructural development (e.g. hospitals, markets and schools) or 
misallocate them (e.g. channel the funds to uneconomic high profile projects instead of vital 
infrastructural projects) with impunity. These lead to a contraction of opportunities for 
foreign direct investments and increases in the costs of production, which make it even 
harder for entrepreneurs and farmers to thrive in the highly demanding global economy. 
This with time retards economic growth in the East African countries.  
 
Besides corruption, there is some autocratic tendencies in the governance systems. The 
ruling elite scheme to hang on to state power indefinitely at all costs even when the stability 
of the country is shaken, and are averse to radical reforms that would enlarge the 
democratic space, improve governance, and guarantee human rights as well as ensure free 
and fair elections in their countries. This phenomenon endures till 2025, when increased 
level of political awareness among the citizens, and pluralism and participatory democracy 
begin to emerge in key countries like Kenya and Ethiopia, leading to improvements in the 
whole region. However the status quo curtails openness in administration, accountability 
and hence economic development. 
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The harmonisation of policies is further complicated by inter- and intra-regional conflicts, 
the emergence of new challenges such as the international and regional terrorism (‘the Al-
Shabaab factor’), the spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic and the distraction of adopting new 
development programmes at the continental level, e.g. the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD).  
 
At the individual country level there are excellent policies, often driven by donor agendas 
(e.g. national poverty alleviation program, national economic reforms, agricultural sector 
development programme, environmental investment, etc), in place but these are not fully 
implemented mainly due to political incompetence and vested interests. Unfortunately, 
these policies also do not allow the smallholder farmers (and even the large-scale farmers 
who are linked to the smallholders) to seize the opportunities that globalisation offers, or 
protect the group of smallholders who are adversely affected by the negative impacts of 
globalisation.  
 
In the absence of regional agreements on the best and sustainable strategies to manage the 
trans-boundary natural resources (e.g. waters of Lake Victoria and Nile River) for the benefit 
of East Africans, the do-it-yourself approach persists. In 2030, this reality is a driving force 
for resource-related conflicts. Tension among the countries such as Kenya and Uganda that 
share water resources and between Tanzania and Kenya that share rangelands for grazing, 
intensifies, and fishermen/pastoralists from each country for instance, are strictly prohibited 
from fishing/grazing beyond the bounds of their national waters/grazing lands. This results 
in violent conflicts in some instances but, ultimately provokes the call for a fully regional 
approach to the management of resources across national borders in 2025. By 2030, some 
progress has been made to mediate these conflicts.  
 
The power-sharing struggles at regional level and the unilateral protocols between and 
within countries undermine economic growth for the whole region. This prompts the AU, 
UN, the US and the EU to come to its rescue but no breakthrough to the regional political 
stalemate is realised. Moreover, the civil war e.g. in Somalia goes on despite efforts by the 
AU to restore peace or establish a government of national unity, regional terrorism in the 
form of constant attacks increasing (the destabilising actions of the Al-Shabaab militant 
group intensify) as does piracy on the East African coastal waters. These actions interrupt 
the movement of people, goods and services across the regional borders whereas the civil 
wars instigate the influx of refugees from the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Sudan and Somalia to the more stable East African countries. Here, they exceed the 
carrying capacity of the designated refugee camps and accelerate environmental 
degradation. 
 
In similar fashion, countries continue to hold general elections regularly (Tanzania 2010, 
Kenya 2012, Uganda 2011, etc. every five years) which makes the political environment 
more fragile and violence-prone, because most of these elections are patently not ‘free and 
fair’. The ensuing violence had economic repercussions throughout the region. This prompts 
the AU, UN, and powers to seek to step in but, in nearly every instance, a breakthrough to 
the political stalemate comes when considerable damage has already been done. People 
coalesce to form movements and associations including CBOs, Faith-based Organisations 
(FBOs) and youth movements in the struggle for improved governance and democracy. 
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The instability also increases the smuggling of arms through the porous East African borders, 
which jeopardises security, pollutes the economic environment and, ultimately, coerces 
governments into spending more of their scarce resources on national security and 
humanitarian assistance.  
 
In summary, East Africa in 2030 is characterised by poor governance, coupled by political 
instability, and consequently is a poverty dominated region. The Global Hunger Index (GHI) 
calculated from three factors -the proportion of undernourished people in a country, the 
preference of underweight children, and the child mortality rate. A score of 20 indicates 
“alarming” levels of hunger and higher than 30 “extremely alarming” levels of hunger. In 
2030, six countries in the East African region - Sudan, Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Rwanda 
featured among the 25 countries with “alarming” levels of hunger, while Somalia and 
Eriteria fall under those with “extremely alarming” levels of hunger.  
 
Regional integration and economic development 
Some individual governments continue to be sceptical of integration to the EAC despite 
enormous effort to revive it. Thus realisation of full regional integration is not reached until 
2025 when most of these countries accede to most of the clauses that ensure economic 
cooperation. In effect though, by 2030 there is still no agreement on a common market, 
currency or political leader in the region; the anticipated progress in integration process and 
socio-economic development is hampered by political conflicts, famine and strains from the 
national structural adjustments programs (NSAPs), paucity of resources to finance the 
identified development projects in addition to, lack of capacity building to formulate and 
harmonise regional policies.  
 
Operationally the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), though with limited impact, are thus the 
only existing ‘regional blocs’. The members of IGAD continue to contribute to the 
organisation’s administrative budget, attend meetings and summits regularly, progressively 
establish technical expert platforms for discussing and working on regional issues, and 
monitor the political environment in order to prevent both intra- and inter-state conflicts. 
One major achievement  within the region is the Regional Conflict Early Warning Centre and 
Peace-keeping Initiative. 
 
The absence of well-functioning market institutions hinders producers from taking 
advantage of  incentives emanating from the global markets because positive changes in 
international prices cannot be transmitted to producers at the farm gate. This also restricts 
market reforms, such as reduction of market costs, which could give impetus to the 
production of cash and (some) food crops. The weak credit institutions compel the 
smallholders to depend on savings from their low incomes, which in turn curtails their ability 
to expand their mechanisation, or increase their  use of fertilisers, modern seeds and other 
farming inputs.  
 
Although the inflation rates across the region have largely been kept in a band of around 9% 
since 2010-11, climate change and rainfall variability have made poor households 
progressively more vulnerable to economic shocks in 2030. The local markets in East Africa 
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are inundated with cheap imported products from China and elsewhere. This affects the 
local industries and smallholder farmers who are unable to cope with the competition 
created by importation of cheap products. To counter this, the East African countries forge 
alliances of convenience at various regional and international meetings and negotiations 
(e.g. negotiations within the ACP-EU framework and the World Trade Organisation). But 
they are unable to consistently speak with one voice on issues regarding market access, 
domestic support, export subsidies and other pertinent issues for agricultural products.  
 
The governments in East Africa react to environmental crises only when the negative 
impacts culminate into disasters or become more evident e.g. ecosystem collapse, 
degradation of water catchments areas, desertification, disease outbreaks or deaths caused 
by water contamination, thus causing panic in governing political circles.  
 
In 2030, food is mainly produced from agriculture activities which are predominantly rain-
fed. Most economic activities rely on natural resources, mainly water bodies, forests and the 
soils which are very sensitive to climate change. Climate change is manifested through 
increased climate variability and increased frequency of extreme conditions like droughts 
and floods. These lead to overall reduction in agriculture productivity and yields, including 
rangelands and livestock production, threatening food security and heightening the risk of 
famine.  
 
Development policies are well written but hardly implemented. The existing socio-political 
structures are to tackle events as they happen (through declaring ‘states of emergency’) 
rather than by preventing them from happening. This situation continues to be costly in 
terms of people’s lives and welfare while building more dependence on the outside world 
for disaster relief. Where the dictates of the global economy and global agreements on 
climate change and the like are honoured in East Africa, this is done with little or nor 
consideration as to the compatibility of such intiatives with the existing regional policy 
environment.  
 
Most EAC member countries and prospective members each want to please the 
international community and win concessions and investments at the expense of other 
member countries. In this situation, the level of importance of the Asian powers during the 
20 years leading up to 2030 increased tremendously. The Asian powers (and BRICS in 
general) step up their efforts to penetrate the region, especially the countries where 
governance is improving and moving towards political stability. They are awarded land for 
agricultural production and development projects, such as mineral exploration and 
exploitation, construction and refurbishment of roads and hospitals etc, at the expense of 
local enterprises (e.g. the road contractors). These projects are executed by expatriates who 
show little regard to the environmental regulations leading to negative impacts such as 
water contamination, pollution, increased greenhouse gases emissions, displacement of 
persons thus locking them out of land use and fuelling conflicts over land and other scarce 
resources, among others. In some countries (e.g. Ethiopia), the Asian powers and other 
multi-national companies even gain control of natural resources (e.g. forests) and convert 
them to agricultural land for production of biofuel (e.g. Jatropha carcus) and food crops. 
With economic profits taking precedence over all the other issues including environmental 
resource management, the ecosystem health deteriorates, due to degradation and 
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overexploitation by the foreign investors. However, local people gain from opportunities to 
learn some skills and modern technologies that they apply to improve their production 
efficiency. 
 
The economic forces operating in the international oil markets ensure that oil prices 
maintain a high price of between $120 and $130 a barrel in the decade leading to 2030. This 
affects food security, transportation of crops, purchase of fertilisers as well as, the use of 
energy for irrigation in the East Africa by smallholder farmers and the poor. In response to 
the escalating oil prices, some governments and investors in the East Africa region divert 
their attention and scarce resources to the production of biofuels at the cost of food crops 
and continue to import food. Food prices retain an upward trend in the global markets, 
which triggers macro-economic instability (e.g. high inflation) and increases poverty and 
hunger levels in East Africa. In this regard, Kenya and Uganda are the most vulnerable in 
2030, while Tanzania and Ethiopia are the least vulnerable. As a corollary, production costs 
rise and the smallholder farmers in most of East Africa reduce the proportion of land that 
they commit to crop production. On the other hand, the rising food prices also present 
opportunities for East African countries to promote agricultural and rural development. This 
opportunity remains hampered by inadequate infrastructure, weak institutions and lack of 
political will to implement supportive policies. In the international arena, the occurrence in 
2015 of another financial crisis similar to the 2008 credit crunch only worsens this volatile 
situation. 
 
Environmental management 
By 2030, changes in land biogeochemistry and biogeography in the region mean an increase 
in tropical woody vegetation over the region at the expense of grasslands, regional increases 
in net primary productivity and total carbon storage compared with the present-day. 
Conversely the trend for the total land with permanent vegetation has begun to decrease 
because of increased human population using the land as a factor of production of other 
goods and services beside agriculture.  
 
East Africa, a populous and economically poor region, thus experiences some ecosystem 
service benefits through increased precipitation, river runoff and fresh water availability, 
resulting to enhancements in net primary productivity that lead to improved crop yields in 
some areas. Temperature increases pose some possible negative impacts for agriculture, 
biodiversity and other ecosystem services. Civil society movements have put pressure on 
governments to address REDD and increased forest cover that has led to greater 
conservation of biodiversity, especially in biodiversity hot-spots. High demand for forest 
resources and agriculture extensification has diminished the level of biodiversity. Due to 
participation by key countries in REDD+ agreements and programmes, there is an increase 
in forest cover. 
 
The increased interest shown by the governments of Kenya and Uganda to improve water 
quality in Lake Victoria has lead to policies that promote better distribution among states 
around Lake Victoria. Political instability and population growth has increased conflict 
between end users in water supply. Improved water technology has provided water to areas 
that previously suffered from scarcity. Climate change make dry areas drier and has resulted 
in the lowering of water tables. 
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Food security  
Countries in the region are forced to depend on food aid and development projects 
implemented in piecemeal fashion and with little consideration for sustainability.  
 
In 2030, East Africa is still characterised by widespread poverty. Local coping mechanisms 
entail changes in eating patterns, an increase in migrations by the pastoral communities, 
increase in urban migration, and exhaustive use of natural resources (water sources, arable 
land, forests and grazing lands). Rainfall variability makes water a major constraint to crop 
and production. Water harvesting has increased in importance for availing domestic and 
agricultural water, either through local based innovations or new technology. But advanced 
technologies are usually neither affordable nor available to farming communities.  
 
EA governments direct more efforts towards urban development than to rural and 
agricultural development. Most governments focus more on giving their countries a total 
urban facelift in terms of communication and transport infrastructure, aiming at only one 
thing; attracting foreign direct investment. The Asian powers take advantage of the grid and 
give the countries in the region what appear to be mouth-watering deals, which most 
countries succumb to, but this increases the debt burden of countries in the region.  
 
In the years leading up to 2030, it is the livestock-based systems which predominate in 
marginal areas that are most affected by the limited rainfall and increased desertification. 
This leads to low productivity and reduced numbers of animals. This low income leads in 
turn to further impoverishment of the livestock keepers. The result being overgrazing, land 
degradation, soil erosion and resource use conflicts in a downward spiral that sees livestock 
numbers diminish further. Livestock keepers’ coping mechanism to drought entails moving 
the animals to areas with available water and forage within the region. However, such 
uncontrolled inter regional and country movement, means increased incidences of 
environmental degradation, land conflicts and the spread of disease. 
 
Given the risk-averse situation the permeates the region, even the limited opportunities for 
embarking on intensive production in agriculture are not taken up. As a result, livelihood 
security and coping mechanisms are placed under considerable stress. Each country takes its 
own route to control, mitigate and adapt the effects of climate change. In such a situation, 
developed countries take the advantage of weakened situation to bring in individual trade 
policies, which are detrimental to the regional development. Research and development 
efforts are constrained by limited resources and technology. When it comes to the question 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation, the limited baseline data are a challenge and 
funded programmes to mitigate global climate change remain few in number. 
Consequently, people in the region continue to rely on local knowledge that does not yield 
much. However there is emerging interest from within and without in supporting adaptation 
and mitigation policy in the region. Existing policies, though well written, are not 
implemented due to a lack of capacity, accountability and sometimes ignorance of the 
political and technocrats in power.  
 
East African countries face evermore devastating food crises. Wet season failures follow 
periods of flood, leading to poor harvests that regularly see the region plunged back into 
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crisis. The East African region, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, has spent 
the past 20 years to 2030 at great risk of repeated famine. However, state actions over the 
past decade have not reflected this urgency: there is too much talk and deliberation on the 
seriousness of the issues, but no substantial policy development and no programmatic 
efforts to address the challenge. 
 
Livelihoods 
In 2030, informal and formal cross-border trade in the region is important. Formal cross-
border trade within the East Africa region improved in 2010, with the signing of the East 
Africa Market Protocol and has generally improved since then. However, because of poor 
governance and polarised borders there is an increase in informal cross-boundary economic 
activities that have led to conflicts among neighbouring countries in the region.  
 
Despite improving conditions in some parts of the East African region, conditions of acute 
food insecurity persist and the number of people in need of assistance increases in conflict-
affected regions. Recurrent conflict, civilian displacement, and market disruptions continue 
to affect access to food and income for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and market 
dependent poor urban households in those regions.  
 
The situation in countries – famines, political crises, insecurity – all result in deteriorating 
quality of life and health for the majority of people. Heavy investment by the Asian powers 
and European countries enables the middle-classes to pay for healthcare. Donors provide 
more funding on health (malaria, HIV/AIDS) especially by 2015 when MDG targets were set 
to be revisited. 
 
 
